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CHOICE OF LAW IN FEDERAL COURTS: FROM ERIE 
AND KLAXO
 TO CAFA AND SHADY GROVE 
Kermit Roosevelt III 
ABSTRACT—Erie is one of our canonical cases. Everyone agrees that it is 
important, but that is about all they agree on. Different understandings of 
Erie abound, and Erie analysis is notoriously complex and confusing. This 
Article offers a simpler way to approach the Erie problem: a choice-of-law 
methodology I call the two-step model. It shows how Erie appears 
somewhat more straightforward when viewed from the choice-of-law 
perspective, and how the two-step model solves some of the most notorious 
Erie problems. Beyond the payoff in terms of clarifying choice-of-law 
analysis in federal courts, the model’s success in this context should serve 
as an advertisement for its use in choice of law more generally. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Everyone agrees that Erie Railroad v. Tompkins is an important case.1 
And at a high level of generality, everyone also agrees on what the case 
stands for: federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction apply federal 
procedure but state substantive law.2 Dig any deeper than that, though, and 
the agreement dissolves.3 
In fact, Erie analysis is notorious for the puzzles it has produced. Does 
the case have any import for state courts? What happens when a federal 
court transfers a case to a district in another state? How should federal 
common law created to fill gaps in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
interact with state law deemed substantive for Erie purposes? Does the 
Constitution require federal courts to follow state choice-of-law rules? Or 




  304 U.S. 64 (1938). See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 
§ 55, at 378 (6th ed. 2002) (“It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie decision.”); Craig 
Green, Repressing Erie’s Myth, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 595 (2008) (describing Erie as one of the 
“cultural pillars of our legal architecture”). 
2
  See, e.g., Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The Revolution of 1938 and Its Discontents, 
61 OKLA. L. REV. 275, 276 (2008) (offering this characterization); Amanda R. Szuch, Comment, 
Reconsidering Contractual Waivers of the Right to a Jury Trial in Federal Court, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 
435, 442–43 (2010) (same). 
3
  See, e.g., Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 427, 427 (1958) 
(noting “extraordinary confusion” surrounding Erie). 
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The Supreme Court has offered answers to some of these questions,4 
but the Justices have usually differed amongst themselves, and their work 
has received mixed reviews.5 My aim in this Article is to provide a better 
way of thinking about the Erie problem. 
That better way is a conceptual framework developed in the choice-of-
law context, what I will call the “two-step model.” It is appropriate for Erie 
analysis because, I will argue, Erie is in fact best understood as a choice-of-
law case. Part I of this Article will present that argument by engaging in a 
close reading of Erie to show that its conceptual structure is the same as 
that of the classic choice-of-law problem. Parts II and III then demonstrate 
that the understanding of Erie achieved by viewing it through the two-step 
model gives us new insight into some difficult problems, both classic Erie 
puzzles and more recent choice-of-law conundrums. 
But solving those problems is not my sole or final goal. I have argued 
in other publications that this model is the correct way to conceptualize 
choice-of-law problems, but it is by no means universally accepted in that 
context.6 I hope that its success in resolving some of these problems will 
serve as an advertisement for its use in choice of law more generally. I hope 
to show, that is, that Erie is fundamentally a choice-of-law case, that we can 
deal with the problems it creates by using the two-step model, and that the 
model’s success suggests that it is indeed the correct way to think about 
choice of law. 
I. ERIE 
A. The Lower Courts and the General Law 
One dark night, Pennsylvania resident Harry Tompkins was walking 
alongside the tracks of the Erie Railroad in Hughestown, Pennsylvania 
when he was struck and knocked down by an object—probably the 
swinging door of a refrigerator car—protruding from a passing train.7 As he 
 
4
  See, e.g., Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that federal 
courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply state choice-of-law rules); Ferens v. John Deere Co., 
494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990) (holding that interdistrict transfer should not affect choice of law). 
5
  See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., 
ot Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the 
Supreme Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?, 73 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 963 (1998). 
6
  See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means 
of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1861–64 (2005) [hereinafter Roosevelt, Renvoi]; Kermit 
Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2450 (1999) 
[hereinafter Roosevelt, Myth]. 
7
  For a detailed recounting of the facts of Erie, see Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Story of Erie: How 
Litigants, Lawyers, Judges, Politics, and Social Change Reshape the Law, in CIVIL PROCEDURE 
STORIES 21, 35–38 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d. ed. 2008). See also Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 
604 (2d Cir. 1937). 
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fell, his right arm went under the wheels of the train.8 Most of the arm was 
severed, and the remainder was later amputated by doctors.9 Tompkins sued 
the railroad in federal district court in New York, claiming the railroad had 
been negligent in allowing the door to swing open.10 
A crucial question was the duty the railroad owed to Tompkins, who 
was a trespasser on its right-of-way. Pennsylvania courts had ruled that for 
pedestrians on a path parallel to the tracks (as opposed to a crossing), the 
railroad had a duty only “to refrain from willful or wanton injury.”11 The 
railroad relied on these cases. Tompkins argued, and the railroad conceded, 
that “the great weight of authority in other states [was] to the contrary,” 
imposing an ordinary negligence standard.12 
What law should determine the duty of care? Although Erie analysis is 
now concerned with whether federal or state law should be applied, Erie 
itself did not present a choice between state and federal law. No one argued 
that federal law should control. There was no federal law setting the duty of 
care (although given that the case concerned a railroad, there could have 
been), and the Rules of Decision Act provided that in the absence of federal 
law, the “laws of the several states” should govern.13 Nor did it present a 
choice between state laws; no one argued that the law of any state other 
than Pennsylvania should determine the duty of care. The key question was 
whether it was an issue of local or of general law.14 
To understand this distinction, we need to return to the analytical 
framework that the district court and Second Circuit used, the one 
canonically associated with, though not created by, Swift v. Tyson.15 Under 
the Swift framework, there were essentially three types of law. First, there 
was federal law: the Constitution, federal statutes, and treaties.16 This law 
was created by the federal government, or by the National People in the 
case of the Constitution, and federal courts were supreme in its 
interpretation. Second, there was state law, consisting of state constitutions, 
state statutes, and decisions of state courts on some common law matters 
deemed “local”—typically issues such as rights to real property within the 
 
8
  Purcell, supra note 7, at 38. 
9
  Id. 
10
  Id. at 39, 40. 
11
  Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604 (citing Falchetti v. Pa. R.R., 160 A. 859 (Pa. 1932)) (noting the 
defendant’s argument that this was the current local law under Falchetti, but ultimately deciding that 
“we need not go into this matter”); see also Koontz v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 163 A. 212 (Pa. 1932). 
12
  Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604. 
13
  See Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 
Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006))). 
14
  See Tompkins, 90 F.2d at 604 (deciding that issue was one of general rather than local law). 
15
  41 U.S. 1; see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102 (1945) (observing that Swift “did not 
enunciate novel doctrine”). 
16
  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (identifying types of federal law). 
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state.17 This law was made by state governments and state courts were its 
authoritative interpreters. (Thus, for instance, both federal courts and courts 
of other states would defer to the interpretation of a state statute given by 
that state’s court of last resort.) Last, and oddest to the modern eye, there 
was general law. General law included most of the classic common law 
subjects of tort and contract.18 It was not created by any government, but 
rather deduced by judges.19 And because it was not the creation of any 
particular government, no court could claim to be authoritative in its 
interpretation. Federal courts could come to their own conclusions about the 
content of the general common law, and so could the courts of the several 
states, with neither exerting any more than persuasive influence on any 
other.20 
At the time Erie was filed, both the district court and the Second 
Circuit had ruled that the duty of care owed by a railroad to a trespasser on 
its property was a question of general law.21 The railroad, of course, 
disagreed, and its contrary contention formed the primary part of its 
argument to the Supreme Court.22 But assuming that the lower courts were 
correct as to the characterization as general law, what should the result have 
been under the Swift framework? Had Tompkins sued in Pennsylvania, he 
would have gotten the Pennsylvania courts’ view of the correct answer 
under the general law: the “willful or wanton” standard. A New York state 
court would have given him its own independent understanding: apparently 
the negligence standard that most states used.23 And if Tompkins had 
chosen a federal court (as he did), that court, no matter where it was 
 
17
  See Swift, 41 U.S. at 18 (describing local issues as those relating to things “immovable and 
intraterritorial in their nature and character”). 
18
  See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Ex Parte Young and the Transformation of the Federal Courts, 1890-
1917, 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 931, 947 (2009) (“[B]y the late nineteenth century the federal courts had 
stretched the ‘general’ law to include most common-law fields, including wills, contracts, torts, deeds, 
mortgages, rules of evidence, and measures of damages.”). 
19
  See, e.g., Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 378 (1893) ([G]eneral law . . . does not 
depend upon any statute, it does not spring from any local usage or custom . . . but it rests upon those 
considerations of right and justice which have been gathered into the great body of the rules and 
principles known as the ‘common law.’”); Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with 
Jurisdiction?, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1071, 1159–60 (1994) (quoting Baugh, and describing the deductive 
nature of judicial reasoning). 
20
  See generally Kermit Roosevelt III, Light from Dead Stars: The Procedural Adequate and 
Independent State Ground Reconsidered, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1888, 1896–97 (2003) (describing 
independent interpretation of general law). 
21
  See Tompkins v. Erie R.R., 90 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir. 1937) (citing cases). 
22
  See Brief for Petitioner at 23–25, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (No. 367), 1938 WL 
35347, at *23–25. The brief does not make a frontal attack on Swift, but instead argues that courts have 
misapplied the doctrine, which should distinguish between local and general issues primarily by the 
criterion of whether state courts have established a firm rule. 
23
  See N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. v. Kmetz, 193 F. 603, 606 (2d Cir. 1912). 
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located, would also have given its independent interpretation of the general 
law. 
Tompkins knew this, of course, which is why he chose federal court: 
forum shopping is law shopping, and he wanted the federal understanding 
of the general law. All went according to plan in the lower courts, but at the 
Supreme Court level, the case took a very different turn. 
B. The Supreme Court and the Constitution 
The parties, as noted above, disputed whether the railroad’s duty of 
care was a matter of general law or of local law. The railroad argued in 
addition that Swift had been misconstrued, and that the local–general 
distinction should take into account not just the character of the issue, but 
also the degree to which state courts had settled on a definite rule.24 It did 
not ask the Court to overrule Swift. 
That issue, however, was the one the Court took up in the first sentence 
of the opinion. “The question for decision,” Justice Brandeis wrote, “is 
whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v. Tyson shall now be 
disapproved.”25 Brandeis found three grounds on which to fault Swift. 
First, Swift, to some extent, was an exercise in statutory interpretation. 
When the Rules of Decision Act directed federal courts to use the “laws of 
the several states” in the absence of federal law,26 did the word “laws” 
include the decisions of state courts on common law matters? Swift had said 
no, Brandeis wrote, but “the more recent research of a competent scholar,” 
namely Brandeis’s friend Charles Warren, “established that the construction 
given to [the Act] by the Court was erroneous.”27 
Warren may or may not have been right on this point,28 but the 
argument about the correct interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act (I 
will call this “statutory Erie”) would not by itself have been enough to lead 
the Court to overturn Swift. Stare decisis, the Court often observes, has 
greater force in cases of statutory interpretation, and when the Court has 
applied one reading of a statute for a century or more, it will take more than 
competent scholarship to make it change course. Erie itself says as much.29 
The second problem was that Swift had turned out to work rather 
poorly in practice. The fact that federal courts were not bound to follow 
 
24
  See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 22, at 24–25. 
25
  Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938) (footnote omitted). 
26
  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
27
  Erie, 604 U.S. at 72–73 & n.5 (citing Charles Warren, 
ew Light on the History of the Federal 
Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 51–52, 81–88, 108 (1923)).  
28
  See Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal 
Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 760 & n.117 (1986); Green, supra note 
1, at 600 n.23. 
29
  See Erie, 304 U.S. at 77 (“If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should 
not be prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century.”). 
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state courts on matters of general law meant that there were frequently two 
different rules of law in force inside a single state, either of which was 
available to a party able to get into federal court. The strategic invocation of 
federal jurisdiction produced a predictable set of horror stories,30 and the 
resultant uncertainty proved more generally undesirable.31 
Viewed with the benefit of hindsight, the Swift regime seems 
misguided. But things might have turned out much better. The aim, or at 
least the hope, of the Swift approach was presumably that the federal 
interpretation of the general law would win acceptance in state courts.32 If 
this occurred, the result would be law that was uniform not only within a 
single state but across the whole nation—a very desirable consequence for 
commercial law, Swift’s subject. 
Experience, Erie admits, discouraged this prophecy. “Persistence of 
state courts in their own opinions on questions of common law prevented 
uniformity; and the impossibility of discovering a satisfactory line of 
demarcation between the province of general law and that of local law 
developed a new well of uncertainties.”33 So the second aspect of Erie (I 
will call this “policy Erie”) is the desire that a federal court exercising 
diversity jurisdiction be, for practical purposes, “only another court of the 
State,” as Felix Frankfurter put it.34 Swift had thwarted this policy, and 
Brandeis hoped to further it. 
This policy concern would for some have been a sufficient reason to 
overturn Swift. But Erie declined to rest on the policy argument, deeming it 
an inadequate justification to “abandon a doctrine so widely applied 
throughout nearly a century.”35 Instead, Erie turned to a third problem with 
Swift: “the unconstitutionality of the course pursued,” Brandeis wrote, “has 
now been made clear and compels us to [abandon it].”36 Thus, according to 
Brandeis, there is also a third, constitutional, basis for the decision (I will 
call this “constitutional Erie”).37 But what is it? 
 
30
  Likely the most famous is Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & 
Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928), where a taxi company reincorporated under another state’s law in 
order to create diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 523–24. 
31
  Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. 
32
  See id. (“[T]he benefits expected to flow from the rule [in Swift] did not accrue.”). 
33
  Id. (footnote omitted). 
34
  Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945). 
35
  Erie, 304 U.S. at 77. 
36
  Id. at 77–78. 
37
  The availability of the alternative ground of policy explains why it was at one time “fashionable” 
to call the constitutional argument dictum. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 693, 702 n.59 (1974). But that practice was apparently ended by Alfred Hill’s trenchant 
observation that “it is difficult to view as dictum the Court’s statement of a legal proposition without 
which, we are assured in the opinion, and have no reason to doubt, the case would have been decided the 
other way.” Hill, supra note 3, at 439. 
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There is a surprising amount of disagreement about Erie’s 
constitutional source.38 But the basic outline should be relatively clear. The 
main move that constitutional Erie makes—the fulcrum on which all else 
turns—is to deny the existence of the general law. Swift’s “fallacy,” 
Brandeis says, quoting Justice Holmes, is 
the assumption that there is “a transcendental body of law outside of any 
particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute,” 
that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what the rules of 
common law are; and that in the federal courts “the parties are entitled to an 
independent judgment on matters of general law”—: “but law in the sense in 
which courts speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority 
behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called 
common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State 
existing by the authority of that State . . . .”39  
So Erie’s central claim is that the idea of general law, produced by no 
sovereign and hence possessing no authoritative interpreter, is simply 
specious. “There is no federal general common law,” Brandeis wrote40—a 
slight imprecision, because what he meant was that there was no general 
law at all. The rules that courts applied in diversity cases could not be 
drawn from what Holmes derided as a “brooding omnipresence in the 
sky.”41 They had to come from some government, either state or federal. 
As I have already said, no one thought these rules were federal law 
made by the federal government. If they had been, all the Swift-era 
“diversity” cases would have been federal question cases. And so the 
problem of intrastate disuniformity would not have arisen because the 
federal law would have preempted contrary state laws. Obviously, neither 
of these situations obtained under Swift. 
Moreover, they could not be federal, for the federal government does 
not have a general lawmaking power; it has the specific powers the 
Constitution gives it.42 As Brandeis put it, “Congress has no power to 
declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they 
be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a part of the 
 
38
  See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1289, 1289 (2007) 
(“The constitutional rationale of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins has remained elusive for almost seventy 
years.” (footnote omitted)). 
39
  Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow 
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
40
  Id. at 78. 
41
  S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
42
  See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (defining as a “first principle[]” that 
“[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers” (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, 
§ 8)). 
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law of torts.”43 So the general practice under Swift was unconstitutional, 
even though Congress, had it wanted, could have regulated in some cases.44 
In any case, Congress had not exercised its regulatory power, so the 
only possible source of law was the states45—or, conceivably, the federal 
courts. Can federal courts make law in diversity cases without 
congressional direction? Here Erie scholars diverge, some assuming that 
the lawmaking power of the federal courts is coextensive with that of 
Congress and some suggesting it is likely far narrower.46 The idea that 
federal courts can make law at will on any issue within the scope of 
congressional legislative power strikes me as prima facie implausible. 
Congress is a politically accountable branch, one of whose houses, in the 
original design, was responsible directly to state legislatures, and it is quite 
a stretch to suppose that the Constitution implicitly vested equivalent 
lawmaking power in unelected and life-tenured federal judges.47 
But what lawmaking power the federal courts might have in other 
cases is, like the reach of congressional power, beside the point as far as 
Erie itself is concerned. In Erie, the Supreme Court did not seem inclined 
make any federal common law of railroad duties of care, even if it could 
 
43
  Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. Again, this is imprecise because Congress does have the power to declare 
many rules of law binding in a state. For example, given that Erie was about a railroad’s duty of care, 
Congress could certainly have used its power over interstate commerce to prescribe a rule to govern that 
case, had it so chosen. What Brandeis presumably meant was that Congress could not legislate over the 
whole range of topics covered by the general law, or that the mere existence of diversity jurisdiction 
does not create federal lawmaking power. See, e.g., Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of 
Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 926 (1986). 
44
  Such federal law would, however, have created federal question jurisdiction and presumably 
preempted contrary state law, so the result would be federalization rather than restoration of Swift’s 
independent state and federal interpretation. 
45
  What the content of this state law might be is a separate question. Erie affirmed that state courts 
were authoritative in the interpretation of their own law. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“[W]hether the law of 
the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a 
matter of federal concern.”). Michael S. Green has explored the possibility that the Swift approach might 
be permissible if state courts announced that their interpretations of state law were not to be taken as 
authoritative. Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111, 1121–35 
(2011). The idea is intriguing, but I am not persuaded that state courts actually understood the Swift-era 
practice in this light. Brandeis and the Justices in the majority clearly did not; they saw it as resting on 
the existence of a general common law created by no sovereign and in whose interpretation no court 
could be authoritative. 
46
  See Clark, supra note 38 (describing the dispute). 
47
  See id. at 1302–06 (describing political safeguards of federalism governing federal legislation). 
On the other hand, the founding generation’s understanding of common law differed from ours, so 
originalist arguments may be of little use in this area. See Larry Kramer, The Lawmaking Power of the 
Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 279–284 (1992) (“Although the historical background generally 
supports the claim that federal judges can make common law, I would not rely on it for too much 
guidance. One problem is that what it means today to say that judges have common law powers is totally 
different from what it meant to say this in the 18th and early 19th centuries.”). I think Kramer’s general 
view is right: federal courts can make law whenever necessary (i.e., in exclusively federal enclaves) or 
when necessary and proper to implement a statute. See id. at 288.  
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have. With no federal lawmaking power exercised, there was no federal law 
on point, so the only alternative was state law.48 Continuing to follow Swift 
once the existence of general law was disavowed would be to exercise the 
coercive power of the federal courts without any law to justify it.49 
C. The Erie Problem and Choice of Law 
Where does this leave us? Erie has a statutory basis that counts for 
little, a policy basis that is obvious but—according to the Court—
insufficient to produce the decision, and a constitutional ground that is also 
pretty obvious. If there is no federal law on point (and leaving aside the 
disagreements about whether there could be in various cases), a federal 
court must apply state law because that is the only law that could be 
operative. To state the principle more generally, constitutional Erie tells us 
that if only one law reaches the facts of a case, that law must supply the rule 
of decision.50 
To those experienced with choice of law, this principle may have a 
familiar ring: it is essentially Brainerd Currie’s analysis of “false 
conflicts.”51 But a little more explanation is in order to show that Erie is 
actually a choice-of-law case. 
A choice-of-law problem, to put it generally, arises when there is more 
than one sovereign whose law might create rights or obligations related to a 
particular event.52 Scholars and courts have come up with a dizzying array 
of methodologies to choose which law should be used to decide such 
cases.53 Despite their creativity—or, more likely, because of it—the field is 
widely regarded as a conceptual disaster.54 
 
48
  Since no one thought that the general law was federal law, Erie does not actually limit the scope 
of federal lawmaking authority. Instead, it expands the scope of state lawmaking by announcing that 
what had been thought general law is in fact state law. 
49
  What is the constitutional problem with doing that? Sourcing Erie to a particular constitutional 
provision is notoriously difficult, and it is not my main purpose here. I will only suggest, without 
attempting a full defense of the claim, that the Due Process Clause, which protects against state coercion 
“without . . . law” is the best candidate. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
50
  Erie also has some other propositions that sound constitutional in nature—for instance, that a 
state’s law is what that state’s courts say it is, not what someone else might think is a good idea. See 
Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 (“[W]hether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or 
by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern.”). 
51
  See generally BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) 
(creating a taxonomy of choice-of-law cases, including “true conflicts,” “false conflicts,” and 
“unprovided-for cases”). 
52
  See KERMIT ROOSEVELT, III, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (2010).  
53
  See id. at 3–105 (explaining traditional and modern approaches). 
54
  See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (1996) 
(“[C]onflicts of law is dead—killed by a realism intended to save it.”). 
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A better way to approach a choice-of-law problem, I and others have 
suggested,55 is via what I call the two-step model. The first task for a court 
in a choice-of-law case is to determine which sovereigns might attach legal 
consequences to the events and which have in fact done so. This is a matter 
of interpreting the sovereigns’ laws to determine their scope. If more than 
one law reaches the facts of the case and the rights they create conflict, the 
court must proceed to a second step: it must decide which of the competing 
rights will get priority. If, however, only one law creates rights or 
obligations, that law will—indeed, must—supply the rule of decision. 
That principle, of course, is the same one I just identified as 
constitutional Erie. So it should seem prima facie plausible that the model 
that generates this principle (and hence resolves Erie on its facts) might also 
be a useful way to approach more difficult Erie problems. 
Of course, this is not the path that Erie analysis has taken. The 
conventional statement of the basic rule—that federal courts exercising 
diversity jurisdiction apply state substantive law but federal procedure—
suggests that the task is essentially one of characterization: courts must 
decide whether a particular issue is substantive or procedural.56 But the 
Supreme Court soon recognized that trying to draw this distinction in some 
abstract sense was a poor way to proceed.57 Policy Erie—the desire to avoid 
forum shopping—led the Court in Guaranty Trust v. York to say that some 
laws deemed procedural by the state that created them (a limitations period 
in Guaranty Trust itself) would nonetheless be considered substantive for 
Erie purposes and hence given effect in federal court if they were outcome-
determinative. 
Guaranty Trust’s analysis implied that substance and procedure were 
not stable and mutually exclusive categories because a law could be 
procedural in the view of state courts and yet substantive under Erie. 
Further, the converse was also possible: a law that the state deemed 
substantive might address the same issue as, and therefore overlap with, a 
federal procedural rule. Sometimes, the Court hinted in Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Rural Electrical Cooperative, such a law might be so substantive that the 
 
55
  Brainerd Currie’s interest analysis is probably the first self-conscious development of a two-step 
approach to choice of law in American scholarship. See CURRIE, supra note 51, at 183–84 (setting out a 
two-step process of identifying interested states and resolving cases accordingly). Larry Kramer refined 
Currie’s approach. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 982 (1991) (describing 
the two-step approach). This Article is part of my attempt to carry the project further. See generally 
ROOSEVELT, supra note 52 (offering an analytical overview of conflict of laws from a two-step 
perspective). 
56
  See, e.g., Armando Gustavo Hernandez, The Head-on Collision of Gasperini and the Derailment 
of Erie: Exposing the Futility of the Accommodation Doctrine, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 191, 199 n.51 
(2010). 
57
  See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
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federal court would have to give it effect.58 Other times the federal 
procedural rule might be followed.59 Subsequent cases would show that 
whether the court applied state or federal law depended not just on how 
substantive the state law was, but also on whether the federal rule was one 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or judge-made law created to fill 
gaps in the rules.60 Erie analysis, as taught to generations of first-year 
students, follows an ever more complicated flowchart, where surprising 
twists and turns abound.61 
What if we think about Erie as a choice-of-law problem instead, using 
the two-step model?62 Things turn out to be somewhat simpler. The court’s 
task, remember, is first to determine the scope of the different sovereigns’ 
laws, and then to assign priority to one or the other if conflicts exist. 
Erie itself is easy to understand from this perspective. With the general 
law out of the picture, the question of the railroad’s duty of care fell within 
the scope of only one sovereign’s law (Pennsylvania’s); of course its law 
would govern. Erie analysis, the more general choice between federal and 
state law, can also be described within the two-step model. First, the court 
must decide whether federal law or state law grants rights to the parties, or 
whether both laws do—whether the case falls within the scope of the 
different laws. Second, if conflicting rights exist, the court must decide 
which will get priority—whether the federal law will preempt the state law. 
What is the advantage of describing Erie analysis in this way? I hope 
in subsequent sections to demonstrate that it resolves several puzzles. Here 
I will make just a few preliminary observations. 
First, thinking about the scope of laws offers us a useful way to 
understand the meaning and relevance of the distinction between substance 
and procedure. Substantive law, we could say, creates rights that can be 
asserted in any forum.63 Procedural law creates rights that are tied to a 
particular forum and cannot be asserted elsewhere.64 
 
58
  356 U.S. 525, 535–36 (1958) (noting that a state rule may be so “bound up with the definition of 
the rights and obligations of the parties” that “its application in federal court is required”).  
59
  See id. at 537–38 (noting that federal policy may direct application of federal law). 
60
  Compare Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure), with Ragan v. 
Merchs. Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (judge-made law). 
61
  See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 5, at 990. 
62
  For prior suggestions to view Erie from a choice-of-law perspective, see, e.g., Joseph P. Bauer, 
The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1235 (1999); John R. Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 HOUS. L. REV. 
791 (1974). This Article offers the same prescription but differs by employing the two-step 
understanding of choice of law. 
63
  A tort claim, for instance, is uncontroversially substantive, and it should also be uncontroversial 
that a tort claim based on the law of one state can be asserted in the courts of another. 
64
  The right to use a certain number of pages in a reply brief, for example, is uncontroversially 
procedural, and it is also pretty clear that one state’s rule about permissible length will not govern 
litigation in the courts of another state. 
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This definition does not give us any foolproof or mechanical way to 
decide whether a particular rule is substantive or procedural. We will still 
have to do something similar to what courts have done in the past—ask, 
perhaps, whether the law is designed to regulate in-court or out-of-court 
behavior. But it does allow us to be clear about the significance of the 
substance–procedure distinction and to state the problem simply. State 
procedural law will never be given effect in federal courts; it creates no 
rights that can be asserted there. State substantive law may be given effect 
in federal court; but it might also be displaced by conflicting federal 
procedural law. 
That is Erie analysis as far as scope is concerned. Already, I believe, 
there is some payoff from the two-step model in terms of a better 
understanding of substance and procedure. Classically, substance and 
procedure were conceived of as mutually exclusive categories.65 If that is 
the case, one might wonder how state substantive and federal procedural 
law could ever overlap and conflict. One might also think that the Erie 
problem is simply how to decide whether a particular rule is “really” 
substantive or procedural. 
The two-step model takes us beyond this classic formalism. Of course, 
modern thinking also holds that the categories are not mutually exclusive.66 
But if they are not distinct conceptual boxes, what are they? Modern Erie 
analysis does not have a very good answer. It still leaves us with an idea of 
two incompletely overlapping categories and a muddy middle ground of 
things that might be substantive for some purposes but procedural for 
others. 
By contrast, defining substance and procedure in terms of forum-
independence and forum-dependence—that is, in terms of the scope of the 
laws—makes plain how they can conflict: both state substantive and federal 
procedural law create rights that litigants in federal court can assert.67 
What about the muddy middle ground? How can something be both 
substantive and procedural, and how should such a hybrid be treated? If we 
think in terms of the scope of the rights created, these things are not 
 
65
  See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465–66 (tracking the dissolution of the “traditional or common-sense 
substance-procedure distinction”). 
66
  See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 
801, 802 (2010) (“[P]rocedure is inherently substantive . . . [and] the converse is also true.”). The 
Supreme Court recognized the point in 1945. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108–09 
(1945). 
67
  A state might, for instance, create a tort cause of action and give the plaintiff five years to sue on 
the grounds that the full extent of this particular kind of injury cannot be immediately determined. That 
is a justification that applies regardless of the forum; it means that the five-year period is substantive. 
The federal government might, however, have a rule that all tort claims must be brought within four 
years. This is surely a procedural rule as I have defined the term—it is intended to promote timely filing 
in federal court and will not operate in state courts. But in federal court, it will conflict with the 
substantive state right. 
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mysterious either. Some rules will have both procedural and substantive 
(forum-dependent and forum-independent) purposes behind them. 
Limitations periods, at issue in Guaranty Trust, are one example. The 
consequence is straightforward. If there is a substantive purpose, a right can 
be asserted in any forum, regardless of whether there is also a procedural 
purpose whose scope is limited to particular courts. 
But, one might ask, what about state procedural rules that are 
substantive for Erie purposes? In Guaranty Trust, the Supreme Court held 
that some outcome-determinative rules (notably including limitations 
periods) would be given effect in federal court even if the state that created 
them classed them as procedural. Such rules might seem to pose a problem 
for the choice-of-law-based analysis—are they not state procedural rules 
that are given effect in federal court, contrary to my definition of substance 
and procedure? 
No, they are not. If a state rule is procedural in my sense, constitutional 
Erie tells us that it cannot be used to decide an issue in federal court.68 A 
federal case falls outside the scope of a state procedural rule—the state rule 
creates no rights that can be asserted in federal court—and so federal law 
must supply the rule of decision. The scope of state law is a matter of state 
law; a federal court lacks the power to decide that, regardless of what the 
state wants, the state’s law will give rights to certain parties.69 
What then are we to make of Guaranty Trust? There are two 
explanations that the choice-of-law perspective offers. First, as to the 
specific facts of the case itself, it is probably wrong to call limitations 
periods procedural. A limitations period does have a procedural purpose, 
which is to allocate judicial resources to the litigation of fresh rather than 
stale claims. And were that its only purpose, it might reasonably be classed 
as procedural and its assertion limited to a particular forum. But it is also 
intended to give defendants peace of mind after a prescribed period, and 
that is clearly a right intended to be conveyed regardless of forum—that is, 
a substantive right. It is thus no surprise that the traditional characterization 
 
68
  This point may not be intuitively obvious, but further reflection should convince any skeptics. If a 
state statute contains explicit limits on the scope of the rights it creates, a federal court cannot disregard 
those limits and still claim to be enforcing a state-law right. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 
356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958). This is obviously true with respect to, say, the elements of a cause of action—
a federal court cannot decide to require only three when the state law has four—and no less true with 
regard to a limit providing that the right may be asserted only in state court, so long as that limit is 
constitutional. 
69
  For example, if a state wrongful death statute limits its scope to deaths “caused in this state,” a 
federal court surely lacks power to award recovery under it for an out-of-state accident. Some 
complications exist—there are presumably some rights that a state could not grant litigants in its courts 
but withhold from those in federal court, in just the same way that it could not withhold them from 
parties in the courts of other states. See Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. v. George, 233 U.S. 354, 360 (1914). 
But those would be rights that are not even arguably procedural in the sense of governing in-court 
behavior. 
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of limitations periods as procedural has been widely rejected by states 
through the enactment of borrowing statutes.70 
Second, and more generally, when a federal court decides to apply a 
rule that a state deems procedural on the ground that it is outcome-
determinative, it is not giving state-created rights an effect that their creator 
disclaimed, because it lacks the power to do this.71 Rather, it is creating 
federal law that incorporates the substance of the state rule. Incorporation of 
state law is actually relatively common.72 Even when constitutional Erie 
tells us that federal law must supply the rule of decision because there is no 
state law on point, then policy Erie may suggest that the federal law should 
incorporate a state rule. 
So the choice-of-law perspective gives us a simpler understanding of 
what is at stake in Erie analysis. It gives us a better account of what is going 
on in Guaranty Trust-type situations: in accordance with Erie’s policy goal 
of substantial uniformity, the federal court is making federal law that tracks 
the law of the state in which it sits.73 In the remainder of this Article, I will 
try to show some other connections between Erie and choice of law. 
Erie analysis can help us better see how choice of law should work—
Erie will turn out to have implications in state courts as well as federal 
ones.74 Choice-of-law analysis, in turn, can explain some of Erie’s 
progeny—notably, it can explain why Erie analysis differs depending on 
the source of the federal rule.75 Putting the two together can tell us 
something about still other problems, such as how federal courts should 
deal with state choice-of-law rules in the context of the Class Action 
Fairness Act.76 To start, though, I will turn to Erie’s most direct descendant 




  See generally Ibrahim J. Wani, Borrowing Statutes, Statutes of Limitations and Modern Choice of 
Law, 57 UMKC. L. REV. 681 (1989) (discussing borrowing statutes). 
71
  Again, a federal court lacks power to expand the scope of a state right. Ragan v. Merchs. Transfer 
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949) (“[W]e cannot give [the cause of action] longer life in 
the federal court than it would have had in the state court without adding something to the cause of 
action.”). 
72
  Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S 497 (2001) (incorporating state preclusion 
rules) is a notable example in the Erie context. 
73
  I think that this account is better because the idea that Guaranty Trust means that a federal court 
can override a state’s characterization of its own law is constitutionally untenable. 
74
  See infra Part III.A. 
75
  See infra Part III.C. 
76
  See infra Part III.D. 
77
  313 U.S. 487 (1941). 




A. The Decision 
Erie, dealing with a railroad engaged in interstate commerce, did not 
provide the best facts to illustrate the thesis that general law issues lay 
beyond the power of the federal government. Similarly, Klaxon’s facts are a 
poor choice to illustrate the principles for which it stands, and although I 
will propose altering them to facilitate analysis, it is nonetheless worth 
stating them briefly. 
In 1918, Stentor Electric Manufacturing, a New York corporation, 
transferred its entire business to Klaxon Company, a Delaware 
corporation.78 Klaxon agreed to use its best efforts to manufacture and sell 
some devices for which Stentor held patents and to give Stentor a share of 
the profits.79 In 1929, unhappy with Klaxon’s efforts, Stentor sued in the 
federal district court in Delaware.80 As the contract was formed in New 
York and performance began there, the district court applied New York 
substantive law.81 In 1939, Stentor won a jury verdict for $100,000.82 It then 
sought to increase the judgment by adding 6% interest dating from the 
filing of the suit on June 1, 1929.83 Such interest was allowed under New 
York law, but not, as the plaintiff alleged, under the law of Delaware.84 
Whose law should determine whether this interest should be allowed? 
From the Erie perspective, this was an issue of substantive law, so Erie 
answered that state law should determine it. But which state’s law? 
Deciding between Delaware and New York required an interstate choice-of-
law decision turning on whether the availability of interest was substantive 
or procedural (this distinction operating now in the choice-of-law sense, 
rather than the Erie sense). Substantive issues in choice of law are 
determined by the law providing the cause of action (in this case, New 
York), while procedural ones are determined by the law of the forum (in 
this case, Delaware). In an opinion by Herbert Goodrich, the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals pronounced the availability of interest to be substantive: 
“[I]t is clear by what we think is undoubtedly the better view of the law that 
the rules for ascertaining the measure of damages are not a matter of 
procedure at all, but are matters of substance . . . .”85 
What law was the court using to resolve this choice-of-law question—
to decide whether the issue was substantive or procedural? It cited no state 
 
78
  Id. at 494. 
79
  Id. 
80
  Id. 
81
  Id. at 494–95. 
82
  Id. at 494. 
83
  Id. at 494–95. 
84
  Id. at 494–95, 497. 
85
  Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 115 F.2d 268, 275 (3d Cir. 1940). 
106:1  (2012) Choice of Law in Federal Courts 
 17
law as support for its characterization, but rather relied on the First 
Restatement of Conflicts and two treatises, one written by Joseph Beale (the 
Reporter of the First Restatement), and one by Herbert Goodrich (the author 
of the opinion).86 The oracular pronouncement that this was “the better 
view” certainly smacked of the forbidden general law. But because that no 
longer existed at the time of the Third Circuit’s decision in 1940, it would 
be more charitable to read Goodrich’s opinion as federal common law. This 
would be permissible if choice-of-law rules were procedural in the Erie 
sense—then federal courts would of course apply federal choice-of-law 
rules and state courts would apply state rules. 
But, said the Supreme Court, they are not. “We are of opinion that the 
prohibition declared in Erie . . . against such independent determinations by 
the federal courts, extends to the field of conflict of laws.”87 In the Erie 
sense, choice-of-law rules are substantive and federal courts must therefore 
apply those of the states. The facts of Klaxon are complicated, dealing as 
they do with the substance–procedure characterization, but the reasoning 
seems fairly straightforward. Federal courts apply state substantive law in 
diversity actions, and choice-of-law rules are substantive; hence, federal 
courts must apply state choice-of-law rules. 
B. Assessment 
While Erie is generally celebrated in the legal academy,88 Klaxon has 
received a much more mixed reception. Henry Hart and others have 
criticized it as destructive of much of the intended benefit of diversity 
jurisdiction, which aimed to protect out-of-staters from unfavorable local 
law as well as biased courts.89 And even those who favor Klaxon do not 
give it as much respect as Erie. Klaxon is not constitutionally grounded, 
most people think; it is merely a policy-based extension of the Erie 
doctrine.90 Erie, on this view, tells us that federal courts exercising diversity 
 
86
  Id. at 275–76 (“With regard to the item of interest as damages for breach of a contract the 
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, § 418 says: ‘The rate of interest allowed as part of the damages for the 
breach of a contract is determined by the law of the place of performance.’ See also Goodrich on 
Conflict of Laws (2d Ed. 1938) 215 and cases cited in note 101; 2 Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) 
1335 and cases cited in note 6.”). 
87
  Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. 
88
  See Green, supra note 1, at 595 & n.2. 
89
  See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 
513–15 (1954); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional 
Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 282 (1992); see also, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, 
The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave 
ew World for Erie and 
Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79 (1993) (critiquing Erie and Klaxon); Scott Fruehwald, Choice of Law in 
Federal Courts: A Reevaluation, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 21 (1998) (criticizing Klaxon). 
90
  See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1502 (2008) (noting that Klaxon is “not constitutionally 
required”); Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in 
ational Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
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jurisdiction should apply the substantive law of the states in which they sit. 
Klaxon just takes the modest additional step of deciding that choice-of-law 
rules are substantive for Erie purposes, much as Guaranty Trust made that 
decision for limitations periods.91 
I will argue that this view of Klaxon is seriously mistaken, but the 
analysis will prove easier to follow and likely more convincing if we 
consider not the facts of Klaxon itself, but a slightly different situation. This 
is not an attempt to tilt the field in my favor but rather to return it to level. 
Klaxon is a decision about the status of choice-of-law rules under Erie, but 
it features the esoteric and somewhat confusing example of substance–
procedure characterization. Characterization is a persistent problem in 
choice of law, but it is not the main focus. Instead, choice-of-law rules 
primarily do two things, corresponding to the two steps of the model set out 
earlier. First, choice-of-law rules set the scope of state law.92 They 
determine who can claim rights under state law—what people, where, and 
in what circumstances. In this function, they are what I call “rules of 
scope.” Second, they resolve conflicts between state laws.93 They determine 
which of two conflicting rights under different states’ laws will prevail. In 
this function, they are what I call “rules of priority.” 
Let us suppose, then, that rather than a substance–procedure 
characterization, we are dealing with the more usual issues of scope and 
priority. Suppose that a married couple from Iowa drives into Kansas and 
gets into an accident there, for which the wife sues the husband. As far as 
substantive law goes, suppose that Iowa follows the doctrine of interspousal 
tort immunity: Iowa does not allow spouses to sue each other. Kansas does 
not follow the doctrine, so spouses may sue each other under its law. As far 
as choice of law goes, Kansas follows the traditional territorialist approach, 
deciding tort cases under the law of the place of injury, while Iowa has 
adopted the more modern Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, which directs 
courts to apply the law of the state with the “most significant relationship” 
to an issue in dispute.94 
How will the states approach this case? They need to determine the 
scope of the relevant laws and their relative priority if a conflict exists. But 
they would do so in different ways, consistent with the different approaches 
to choice of law they have adopted. 
The Kansas court would focus on the location of the accident. Because 
the accident occurred in Kansas, the territorialist approach holds, the 
parties’ rights and liabilities must be determined in accordance with Kansas 
 
2001, 2027 (2008) (“The Klaxon rule . . . is not required either by the Constitution or by the Rules of 
Decision Act.”). 
91
  See supra text accompanying notes 68–69. 
92
  See ROOSEVELT, supra note 52. 
93
  Id. at 2. 
94
  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188 (1971). 
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law. As far as scope goes, Kansas law attaches legal consequences and 
other laws do not. Because no other state’s law reaches the accident, there is 
no need for a determination of relative priority: Kansas law governs and the 
wife prevails. (According to the Kansas view of things, that is, this accident 
presents the same kind of situation as Erie: the accident falls within the 
scope of only one sovereign’s law.) 
An Iowa court, by contrast, would not use state borders to circumscribe 
the scope of state law. Using the Second Restatement, it would assume that 
state laws have broad scope, possibly as broad as the Constitution allows.95 
Kansas law grants the wife a cause of action, but Iowa law provides the 
husband with a defense. Finding conflicting rights, the Iowa court would 
proceed to a priority determination: it would ask which state has the most 
significant relationship to the issue of interspousal tort immunity. It would 
decide that this state is Iowa, as the state of the marital domicile, and it 
would apply Iowa law: the husband prevails.96 
 
  Analysis in Kansas Court Analysis in Iowa Court 
Scope: Only Kansas law creates rights Both states’ laws create rights 
Priority: No need for priority 
determination 
Iowa law prevails 
Outcome: Wife wins Husband wins 
 
This revised fact pattern may make it easier to see how Klaxon works. 
Klaxon says that federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply 
the choice-of-law rules of the states in which they sit.97 Thus, if this case 
could be heard in federal court,98 a district court in Kansas would adopt 
territorialism and find no interspousal tort immunity defense available, 
while one sitting in Iowa would follow the Second Restatement and give 
priority to the immunity. But must the federal courts do this under 
constitutional compulsion, or is Klaxon based only on policy grounds? 
The argument for a constitutional basis is quite simple.99 Once a federal 
court has decided, for whatever reason, to apply a state’s law, there are 
limits on the extent to which it can deform that law. Suppose, for instance, 
that a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction were to apply a state 
 
95
  See id. § 9. 
96
  See id. §§ 6, 169. 
97
  See supra text accompanying note 87. 
98
  As I have constructed the hypothetical, diversity jurisdiction would not be available, but 
supplemental jurisdiction might be if we added appropriate additional facts. 
99
  See Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 6, at 1861–64. 
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statute that required a plaintiff to show four elements of a tort to recover. 
Could the judge decide that in federal court only three elements would be 
required? Certainly not, at least if she still claimed to be applying state 
law.100 
What if the issue were not about the required elements of the cause of 
action, but about the geographical scope of state law? What if the statute 
said that it applied to all torts “committed within this state”? There, too, the 
federal court could not disregard that geographical restriction and still claim 
to be applying state law.101 And why should the analysis change if the scope 
of state law is set not by statutory language, but rather by a choice-of-law 
approach developed by the state’s high court? Statutory Erie tells us that the 
decisions of state courts are part of the laws of the states.102 The scope of 
state law is a question of its meaning, and no one now doubts that state 
courts have the last word on the meaning of state law. As the Supreme 
Court put it later in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 
“[F]ederal courts . . . must respect the definition of state-created rights and 
obligations by the state courts.”103 
So the federal court should not be free to disregard a state’s definition 
of the scope of its law, whether that definition is accomplished through 
explicit statutory language or through choice-of-law rules.104 On the facts I 
have set out, a federal court that decided to apply Kansas law would have to 
respect the territorial limits Kansas courts placed on its scope, and one 
applying Iowa law would have to respect the fact that the Iowa courts do 
not consider their law territorially limited. Doing anything else would not 
truly be applying state law. 
Klaxon is constitutionally grounded, according to this argument, to the 
extent that it directs federal courts to follow state rules about the scope of 
their law. The argument that state choice-of-law rules are substantive in this 
sense—so much a part of state-created rights that a court that ignores them 
is not really applying the law of that state—is both straightforward and 
strong. We could even describe it as an application of constitutional Erie: 
on the issue of the scope of a state law, the state has power and the federal 
 
100
  See, e.g., Green, supra note 45, at 1167 (noting that Erie requires federal courts to follow state 
supreme court interpretations of state law). 
101
  Id. The rule that the Supreme Court has announced here is that federal courts must apply state 
law as the state courts have interpreted it, so I am assuming that state courts applied the statutes as 
written—limiting the geographical scope in this example, and requiring four elements of the tort in the 
prior example. 
102
  See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72, 79 (1938). 
103
  356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958). 
104
  Interestingly, the Supreme Court has accepted this point in the context of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act (FTCA). See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 10–13 (1962) (interpreting reference to 
state “law” in FTCA to include choice-of-law rules). 
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government does not;105 therefore, state and not federal law must be 
consulted to determine scope. 
So a Kansas court, to return to my modified Klaxon fact pattern, would 
be entitled to say that Kansas tort law gave rights to all persons and only 
persons injured within the state, and a federal court—whether sitting in 
Kansas or not—would have to respect that definition. The Iowa court would 
be entitled to decide the scope of Iowa law and federal courts would 
likewise have to respect that definition.106 
That is the analysis with respect to the scope of state law. Matters of 
priority are different. States are entitled to decide, within constitutional 
limits, who can claim rights under their laws and who cannot—that is a 
question of the meaning of their laws. But obviously no one state can have 
the last word on the question of whose rights will prevail in case of a 
conflict. State rules of priority are not binding, either on federal courts or 
the courts of sister states, because whether a right created by one state’s law 
should prevail over a right created by another is not a matter within the 
authority of any single state—it is not a question of the meaning of state 
law.107 The question of priority is therefore a question on which federal 
courts should be independent, though for policy reasons—policy Erie, in 
fact—it will usually be desirable to maintain intrastate uniformity by 
following the rules of priority of the state in which they sit. When a state is 
unreasonably aggressive in its rule of priority, however—when it privileges 
local law over foreign law to an unreasonable degree108—a federal court is 
free to resolve the conflict differently. 
As I would analyze my modified Klaxon fact pattern, all federal courts 
would be required to recognize that a conflict exists between Kansas law 
 
105
  The federal government has the power to preempt state law, of course, but a federal court 
exercising diversity jurisdiction does not purport to be exercising that power. 
106
  Later I will argue that state courts must also defer to sister states on the scope of their law. See 
infra Part III.A. 
107
  Such issues are not disputes between states as parties, and therefore there is no need for a 
federal-law solution that binds both. But they otherwise fit the description of interstate disputes that 
cannot be controlled by state law. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural 
Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1325 (1996) (“Because states are coequal sovereigns under 
the Constitution, neither party to an interstate dispute has legislative power to prescribe rules of decision 
binding upon the other.” (footnote omitted)). 
108
  Adoption of state law while reserving a veto power to protect federal interests is relatively 
common. See Roosevelt, supra note 20, at 1904–05 (describing the practice). And it should also be clear 
that an unreasonable disregard of foreign law undermines the federal interest in diversity jurisdiction: 
providing a level playing field for litigants. See Allan Erbsen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 
493, 537–43, 558–59 nn.234, 236 (2008). The harder question is what counts as unreasonable. I would 
expect the reserved federal veto to be invoked in only a very few situations, perhaps only two: first, 
when a state court used its own limitations period to extend an action despite having no contacts with the 
underlying events, see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988), and second, when it relied on 
“public policy” to sever a limit on a foreign cause of action, see Kilberg v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 172 
N.E.2d 526, 527–28 (N.Y. 1961). 
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and Iowa law. That is a question of scope. Each state says, through its 
choice-of-law rules, that its law reaches the case, and those determinations 
must be respected. At the priority stage, each state says that its law 
prevails—Kansas because it gives priority to the territorially appropriate 
law, and Iowa because it believes the state of marital domicile has the most 
significant relationship. Neither state court can bind the other on this 
question, and neither can bind a federal court, though for policy reasons a 
federal court in Kansas should probably follow the Kansas rule, and 
likewise for one in Iowa.109 
C. Recapitulation 
The next Part of this Article will discuss the implications of the two-
step view of Erie and Klaxon for various doctrinal and theoretical puzzles. 
But first, it may be worth attempting a brief summary for the sake of clarity. 
What I have argued thus far is the following: 
The significant move in Erie is its denial of the existence of the general 
law. Once that proposition is accepted, everything else follows in quite 
straightforward fashion. On its facts, Erie is basically a choice-of-law 
decision holding that if only one law reaches the facts—if only one 
sovereign has attempted to (or has power to) regulate the relevant 
transaction or occurrence—then that law must supply the rule of decision. 
Erie also has a policy basis, which is the desire to preserve uniformity 
between state and federal courts within a single state. This policy should 
guide analysis in resolving choice-of-law problems between state 
substantive law and federal procedure—it should help us decide when 
overlapping federal procedure preempts state substance. And it should help 
us decide when federal law should incorporate state law, which is what 
 
109
  One might well ask why federal courts should be merely independent, rather than authoritative. 
If a federal court makes a rule of priority, why is that not federal common law that preempts inconsistent 
state law? If the federal court were making rules of priority pursuant to a direction from Congress, or if 
Congress legislated, I believe the federal rules of priority would be preemptive. For a discussion of such 
legislation, see Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: The Case for Federal Choice of 
Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1 (1991). Uniform federal rules of priority, promulgated under Congress’s 
Full Faith and Credit Clause power, would actually be a nice thing to have. In the absence of 
congressional action, however, the federal lawmaking is based only on necessity: no state has the power 
to answer the priority question authoritatively, so federal courts must be independent. See Hinderlider v. 
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (noting that question of rival state 
claims to water was one “upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either State can be 
conclusive”). If states lacked power to answer the priority question at all, then this necessity-born 
federal law would also supply the rule of decision in state court, as it did in Hinderlider. Id. at 107. But 
given the traditional practice of allowing states wide latitude to decide the issue of priority under their 
own law in their own courts, see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–08 (1981), giving the 
federal rule of priority preemptive force seems a step too far. Alternatively, if this federal common law 
were to have preemptive force, it could still work by incorporating the preexisting state rule as the Court 
did in Semtek. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 506–09 (2001) (incorporating 
state preclusion rules to determine effect of federal court diversity judgments). 
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happens when a state procedural law is characterized as substantive for Erie 
purposes.110 
Klaxon makes obvious sense given the policy aims of Erie. But it also 
has a constitutional source in that once a federal court decides to apply the 
law of a state, it is not free to alter the content of that law. It must respect 
the state definition of rights and obligations, and choice-of-law rules about 
the scope of state law are part of that definition. States have the power to set 
the scope of their laws; federal courts do not. 
Rules of priority are different. The relative priority of two states’ laws 
is a question on which no single state can be authoritative. Federal courts 
are independent of state law on issues of priority. For policy reasons, they 
will usually incorporate the rules of priority of the states in which they sit, 
but they reserve a “federal veto”—the power to diverge from a state rule of 
priority that unreasonably disfavors foreign law. 
III. APPLICATIONS 
Thus far, I have argued for an understanding of Erie and Klaxon that is 
informed by a choice-of-law perspective. That is, it attempts to view the 
cases within the analytical framework that I have elsewhere suggested is 
appropriate for choice of law111: the two-step model that allocates authority 
among sovereigns by first considering the scope of their laws and then by 
using rules of priority to resolve conflicts. Erie is relatively trivial from this 
perspective once the general law is disposed of: because only one sovereign 
has exercised lawmaking power, that sovereign’s law obviously must 
supply the rules of decision. 
Klaxon appears a little different, and here my analysis departs 
substantially from the standard account. I think that my analysis of Klaxon 
is better than the standard view because it reconciles the decision with 
Erie’s constitutional principles—it shows how state authority over the 
scope of state law is, like Erie, a situation in which only one sovereign has 
exercised its regulatory power. It also explains how the “neutral umpire” 
benefits of diversity jurisdiction might be retained without overruling 
Klaxon entirely—if federal courts follow states as to the scope of their law 
while retaining independence on priority questions.112 But I also want to 
argue that the two-step model is superior to the standard account because it 
helps us resolve some otherwise intractable problems. This Part of the 
Article thus examines a selection of Erie–Klaxon problems that have 
proven difficult or notorious. 
 
110
  See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
111
  See, e.g., ROOSEVELT, supra note 52. 
112
  See infra text accompanying notes 147–55. 
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A. Erie and Klaxon in State Courts 
What could Erie and Klaxon mean for state courts? Nothing, is the 
ordinary view. Erie is about the scope of federal authority and the duties of 
federal courts when federal lawmaking power does not exist or has not been 
exercised. It has no implications for state courts. So goes the conventional 
wisdom.113 
But that response is much too quick. The constitutional principle that I 
drew from Erie is a basic premise about the allocation of authority between 
sovereigns, and it applies just as well to interstate relations as to state–
federal ones. Erie’s facts present a situation where federal lawmaking 
power does not exist or has not been exercised, with the consequence that 
state law must supply the rule of decision. Surely this has an interstate 
analogue: if the forum state lacks or has not exercised lawmaking authority, 
some other state’s law must supply the rule of decision. 
Again, the conventional wisdom would probably be to reject this 
argument. Erie depended on the fact that Congress lacks a general police 
power, one might say, and state legislatures have that power. There are no 
topics beyond their authority in the way that the “general law” questions of 
everyday tort and contract were outside congressional power in Erie. 
But this response is demonstrably wrong, even speaking solely in terms 
of our current caselaw. There are topics beyond the lawmaking power of 
the states, and the Supreme Court has said so. One such topic is the rights 
and obligations arising from events that have no connection to the forum 
state. As Michael Green puts it, “Like a federal court, a state court does not 
have lawmaking power simply because it has jurisdiction over a case. The 
transaction being litigated can be subject to the exclusive lawmaking power 
of a sister state.”114 In such cases, the Supreme Court has explained, the 
Constitution forbids the forum state from using its own law as a rule of 
decision.115 Following Green, I will call the duty to use sister-state law 
“horizontal Erie.” 
But horizontal-Erie obligations do not arise only when the entire 
transaction is outside the forum’s lawmaking authority.116 They can also 
exist as to particular issues, even when other issues do fall within it. (This is 
why, in the vertical context, federal courts have to follow Erie when 
exercising supplemental jurisdiction117: the fact that federal law governs one 
issue in a case does not necessarily mean that federal lawmaking authority 
 
113
  See Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 1237, 1239 (2011) (noting the little attention paid to this issue). 
114
  Id. at 1240. 
115
  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981). 
116
  See Green, supra note 113, at 1247. 
117
  See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). 
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reaches every issue.) So what is an issue beyond the lawmaking authority of 
one state? 
How about the content of sister-state law? That each state has 
exclusive authority over the meaning and scope of its law, subject to 
constitutional limits or federal preemption, should seem fairly obvious. It 
follows from constitutional Erie, because states simply lack power to make 
other states’ laws.118 Authority over the question of who can claim rights 
under New York law is given to the courts and legislature of New York and 
withheld from other states, just as clearly as authority over everyday torts 
and contracts was given to the states and withheld from the federal 
government in Erie. The principle also follows from Erie’s assertions about 
the authority of state courts that the laws of the states are what their courts 
say they are, not what someone else might think is desirable.119 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has recognized this principle, deriving it from the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause.120 The conclusion that follows is that state courts are 
constitutionally bound to respect sister-state choice-of-law rules to the 
extent that they define the scope of state law. To the extent this conclusion 
is not honored—to the extent that one state asserts the authority to define 
the scope of another’s law—our choice-of-law system continues the error of 
Swift v. Tyson. 
Perhaps surprisingly, choice of law is still waiting for its Erie. The 
Supreme Court has never said that states’ rules about the scope of their law 
are binding—not when they take the form of choice-of-law rules121—and 
state courts regularly ignore sister-state choice-of-law rules. No one can say 
with confidence why this is so, but I have some guesses. First, much like 
the federal courts during the Swift era, the state courts engaging in this 
practice likely do not realize they are violating the principle of Erie. Swift-
era federal courts, remember, did not think that they were independent of 
state courts on certain questions of state law; they thought that the general 
law was not state law. Just so, state courts today presumably do not think 
they are independent authorities on the meaning of sister-state law, at least 
not if it is clearly established and brought to their attention.122 They simply 
 
118
  Because of the complete lack of lawmaking power, the constitutional argument for this 
application of horizontal Erie is actually stronger than the constitutional argument for Klaxon, where 
Congress has power over choice of law but has not exercised it. 
119
  See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). 
120
  See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1988); see also Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1443 (2010) (plurality opinion) (“New York has no 
power to alter substantive rights and duties created by other sovereigns.”). 
121
  If they take the form of statutory specifications, by contrast, sister-state disregard violates the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
122
  See Wortman, 486 U.S. at 730–31. 
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do not think of choice-of-law analysis in terms of scope and priority; rather, 
they most likely understand it as some sort of metaprocedure.123 
I have argued that this understanding is unsound, but its appeal is 
understandable given that the alternative seems impossible. The second 
factor at work is that if we do suppose that a state’s choice-of-law rules are 
part of its law—so that we must apply them whenever we apply that state’s 
law—we run into all the problems choice of law puts under the name of 
renvoi.124 In particular, if two states’ choice-of-law rules each point to the 
other, it seems simply impossible to decide the case. 
However, this perception is a result of failing to use the two-step 
model. Once we separate choice of law into the two issues of scope and 
priority, it becomes clear that a system whereby each state is authoritative 
with respect to the scope of its own law but not with respect to that law’s 
relative priority is indeed possible. 
Changing the facts of the earlier hypothetical will allow us to see this. 
Suppose, as we did in the discussion of Klaxon, that Kansas follows a 
territorial approach to choice of law while Iowa has adopted the Second 
Restatement. But reverse the facts by supposing that a married couple from 
Kansas gets into an accident in Iowa. Now the Kansas choice-of-law rule—
territoriality—points to Iowa law on the issue of interspousal tort immunity. 
But the Iowa choice-of-law rule—most significant relationship—points to 
the law of shared domicile, Kansas. If we say that states are obliged to heed 
each other’s choice-of-law rules, we seem to have created the dread infinite 
cycle; an endless ping-pong back and forth. 
But we have not. The first step of the two-step model is to think about 
the scope of the states’ laws. Kansas has decided that its law is territorial. 
Well and good for Kansas; its law creates no rights related to an accident in 
Iowa. What about Iowa’s law? To determine the scope of Iowa law, we 
look to the Iowa court. Iowa, following the Second Restatement, gives its 
law maximum scope, so it does create rights related to this accident. Scope 
analysis handles this hypothetical by itself, just as it does Erie: the case 
must be decided under Iowa law because that is the only law that reaches 
the facts, and there is thus no need for a priority determination. 
Why did the scope analysis avoid the paradox that conventional 
choice-of-law thinking generated? Because a state following the 
 
123
  This view is pretty clearly mistaken, I have suggested, because choice-of-law rules do obviously 
set the scope of state law in just the same way as explicit statutory limits. See supra text accompanying 
notes 99–104. The Supreme Court, interpreting a federal statute, has also stated that a state’s choice-of-
law rules are part of its “law” and must be consulted to determine what rights that law gives. See 
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962); see also Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex 
Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 568–70 (1996) (arguing that choice-of-law rules are substantive). 
124
  Literally, “renvoi” means a sending-back or remission. Kramer, supra note 55, at 979–80. In 
choice of law, it is used to refer generally to the question of what effect one state should give to the 
choice-of-law rules of another. 
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conventional thinking will use its choice-of-law approach not only to 
determine the scope of its own law (which is within its power) but also to 
determine the scope of other states’ laws (which is not). What happened in 
the conventional choice-of-law analysis above was that Iowa mistakenly 
deemed Kansas law to be as expansive as its own.125 That is what allowed 
Iowa to conclude that Kansas law should be applied in preference to Iowa 
law even though, according to Kansas courts, Kansas law does not reach the 
facts of the case. 
Accepting that a state’s choice-of-law rules are in part about the scope 
of its law, and hence in part subject to the exclusive authority of that state, 
would be a relatively significant conceptual change in the conventional 
approach to choice of law.126 Its practical consequences, however, would be 
ones that the modern approaches have been moving toward. The Second 
Restatement, though still puzzled by renvoi, has recognized that another 
state’s choice-of-law rules can provide useful information about whether 
that state seeks to regulate a transaction.127 My analysis narrows this point to 
the question of scope and sharpens it to a constitutional command, but the 
import is much the same. 
The change that would come from accepting the two-step model, in 
fact, would be exactly the same kind as that worked by Erie: once we 
realize that a particular legal question (the scope of state law) is within the 
authority of that state and no one else, the independence that other courts 
have asserted on that question looks like an unconstitutional usurpation of 
authority. But just as Erie had policy support in addition to its constitutional 
grounds, this suggestion does too. On questions of scope, it will produce 
uniformity not just within a state (i.e., in state and federal courts) but among 
different states. It will also, as suggested above, eliminate the vexing 
problem of renvoi, which simply never arises in the two-step analysis. 
B. Van Dusen, Ferens, and Characterization 
One of the most notorious oddities of choice of law is the situation that 
results when a case filed under the diversity jurisdiction of a federal court in 
one state is transferred to a district court in another state pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a).128 How should the principles of Erie and Klaxon apply 
 
125
  Kansas also mistakenly deemed Iowa law territorial, but this error was of no real consequence. 
126
  See Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 6, at 1887–90. 
127
  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 cmt. k (1971).  
128
  Section 1404(a) allows federal district courts to transfer cases to another district in which they 
might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006). 
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here? In two cases, the Supreme Court articulated an approach that has left 
commentators scratching their heads.129 
In Van Dusen v. Barrack, the Court decided that a defendant’s transfer 
under § 1404(a) should produce “but a change of courtrooms,” and not a 
change of law.130 For a case filed in federal district court in Pennsylvania 
and then transferred to the district of Massachusetts at the defendant’s 
request (the situation in Van Dusen), the Supreme Court stated that the 
federal court in Massachusetts should apply the same law that the court in 
Pennsylvania would have applied—namely, Pennsylvania choice-of-law 
rules and whatever substantive law they selected. As the Court put it, 
“[T]he critical identity to be maintained is between the federal district court 
which decides the case and the courts of the State in which the action was 
filed.”131 
Thus far, the result may seem reasonable enough. Under Erie, the 
federal court in Massachusetts would have to try to achieve substantial 
uniformity with the courts of some state, and sticking to the state where the 
action was initially filed makes a fair amount of sense. Most obviously, it 
protects the plaintiff’s choice of law, if not forum, by preventing the 
defendant from using § 1404(a) to change the rules as well as the playing 
field. 
Twenty-six years later, however, an odder consequence emerged. In 
Ferens v. John Deere Co., the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, was 
injured in Pennsylvania by a combine manufactured by a Delaware 
corporation.132 Clearly, this gave him a tort claim under Pennsylvania law, 
but that law also provided a two-year limitations period for torts, and Ferens 
did not file his suit until three years after the accident.133 In Pennsylvania 
state court his tort claim would have been untimely, and a federal court in 
Pennsylvania would also have applied the Pennsylvania limitations period 
and dismissed because limitations periods are substantive for Erie purposes. 
So Ferens brought his Pennsylvania tort claims in federal court in 
Mississippi, where the limitations period was six years.134 Crucially, the 
limitations period was considered procedural for choice-of-law purposes by 
the Mississippi courts, meaning that a Mississippi state court would apply 
the Mississippi limit and not the Pennsylvania limit, even though 
 
129
  See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1629, 1635 (2008) (stating that Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990), is a “bizarre 
result” with a “surreal quality”). 
130
  376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964). 
131
  Id. 
132
  494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990). His wife also sued, see id., but for simplicity I will refer to the 
plaintiff as Ferens in the singular. 
133
  Id. 
134
  Id. at 519–20. 
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Pennsylvania law provided the underlying substantive rights.135 Following 
Klaxon, the federal district court in Mississippi applied the same choice-of-
law analysis a Mississippi court would and dutifully deemed the tort claim 
timely. Thereupon the plaintiff moved to transfer the case under § 1404(a) 
and the proceedings moved to the Western District of Pennsylvania.136 
Van Dusen made clear that a defendant who moved for a transfer could 
obtain a change of venue but not a change of law. Not so for plaintiffs, said 
the district court in Ferens. Without “some measure of good faith 
expectation of proceeding in the court in which the complaint is filed” the 
filing in Mississippi was “merely a procedural ploy” that should not allow 
Ferens to pick up the longer limitations period en route to Pennsylvania.137 
The Third Circuit affirmed, initially on the alternate ground that application 
of the Mississippi limitations period would violate the Constitution, but 
ultimately on the same theory.138 
The Supreme Court reversed.139 The five-Justice majority said that 
denying Ferens the ability to rely on the Mississippi limitations period 
would simply encourage him to continue to litigate in Mississippi, which 
was obviously a less convenient forum.140 True, he had sought out that 
forum, and allowing him to take its limitations period with him to 
Pennsylvania rewarded his procedural manipulations. But the burden of 
litigating in Mississippi did not fall on the plaintiff alone, and “[t]he desire 
to take a punitive view of the plaintiff’s actions should not obscure the 
systemic costs of litigating in an inconvenient place.”141 
It may be true, as the Court suggested, that the systemic costs of a 
different rule would be greater if plaintiffs simply litigated entire cases in 
inconvenient forums in order to preserve favorable law. All the same, the 
result in Ferens is surprising. We are used to the idea that plaintiffs go to a 
forum in order to get its law, but we are less used to the idea that they can 
order it for takeout. The end result—that Ferens can litigate in Pennsylvania 
 
135
  Id. 
136
  Id. at 520. 
137
  Ferens v. Deere & Co., 639 F. Supp. 1484, 1491 (W.D. Pa. 1986). 
138
  The first Third Circuit decision, Ferens v. Deere & Co., 819 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987), was 
vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court, Ferens v. Deere & Co., 487 U.S. 1212, 1212–13 (1988) 
(mem.), in light of Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988), which held that a state with no 
connection to underlying litigation could nonetheless apply its own procedural rules, including 
limitations periods. Sun Oil Co., 486 U.S. at 722. On remand, the Third Circuit focused on the forum-
shopping issue and held that Pennsylvania law should control the issue of timeliness. Ferens v. Deere & 
Co., 862 F.2d. 31, 35–36 (3d Cir. 1988).    
139
  Ferens, 494 U.S. at 533. 
140
  Id. at 531. 
141
  Id. at 530. But see id. at 537 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that these costs could be reduced 
by district judges transferring cases sua sponte, and that the Van Dusen rule need not apply to such 
transfers). 
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while retaining a limitations period plucked from Mississippi law—seems 
quite inconsistent with the policy-Erie goal of substantial uniformity.142 
Admittedly, this oddity is not due entirely to the Court’s rule. If 
Mississippi characterized limitations periods as substantive, or if it required 
plaintiffs relying on claims under foreign law to meet the corresponding 
foreign limitations period, as most states do,143 Ferens’s procedural ploy 
would not have worked. Still, the outcome is strange enough that it might 
be worth asking whether we can do better. Apart from adopting the dissent 
and saying that plaintiff-initiated transfers should get transferee law, is there 
another way of looking at the case? 
Again, I think that viewing the matter from the two-step perspective 
will help. The first step is to determine the scope of state law, to ask which 
states’ laws create rights. Pennsylvania law gives Ferens a tort claim, but it 
also gives Deere a defense: the two-year limitations period. Mississippi also 
gives Ferens a right. Because its limitations period runs for six years, it 
gives him a right to sue until that time has elapsed. 
Does the Mississippi right to sue conflict with the Pennsylvania 
defense? Not necessarily. It might be the case that these rights are good 
only in certain courts. Unambiguously procedural rights, like the right to 
use a certain number of pages in a brief or to take a certain number of days 
to file a response, are plainly intended only to apply in the courts of the 
forum.144 Pennsylvania law might allow Ferens fifty pages, and Mississippi 
law only forty, but there is no conflict between them. He has the right to 
fifty pages in a Pennsylvania court and forty in a Mississippi court, and 
neither state intends to confer a right in the courts of the other. 
With respect to limitations periods, however, there probably is a 
conflict. The purpose of the Pennsylvania two-year limit is presumably in 
part to regulate Pennsylvania courts. From this perspective, it is intended to 
allocate Pennsylvania judicial resources to the litigation of fresh rather than 
stale claims, and it reflects an assessment of how quickly tort claims can 
and should be brought.145 If that were the only purpose, we would not 
expect defendants to be able to raise it in the courts of other states. But it is 
also presumably intended to give defendants peace of mind after it has 
elapsed—it is intended to shield them from liability. This defendant-
 
142
  In dissent, Justice Scalia said the file-and-transfer stratagem “reduced to a laughingstock” the 
Erie–Klaxon policy. Id. at 536; see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress, the Federal Courts, and Forum 

on Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1147, 1188–89 
(2006) (arguing that the slippery slope of Van Dusen and its progeny, including Ferens, “leaves one 
nearly breathless”). 
143
  See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, The Persistence of General Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 550 (2006). 
144
  See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
145
  It presumably reflects an assessment of how quickly such claims go stale given the usual 
methods of proof, how important they are compared to the other claims competing for judicial attention, 
how much time plaintiffs need to prepare before filing, and other similar considerations. 
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protective purpose is at stake no matter where litigation takes place, so it is 
reasonable to suppose that Pennsylvania grants this defense to Deere even 
in a Mississippi court. 
Does Mississippi mean to give Ferens a right to sue in its courts? It is 
hard to see what purpose doing so would serve. Mississippi has no obvious 
procedural interest in holding its courts open to foreign litigants longer than 
the courts of foreign states—this seems to consume judicial resources for no 
gain.146 And it has no obvious interest as far as the parties are concerned, 
either—Ferens was not a Mississippi resident, and nothing related to the 
suit happened in Mississippi. But the Mississippi courts had decided that 
their limitations period was intended to govern actions like this. The scope 
of state law, Erie tells us, is what state courts say it is, not what someone 
else would think is wise.147 So Mississippi law does give Ferens a right, and 
it conflicts with Deere’s defense under Pennsylvania law. 
Because there is a conflict between rights, we have to move to the 
second step: deciding which state’s law will get priority. Here, the 
arguments for Pennsylvania law seem quite strong. Pennsylvania law 
creates the cause of action; surely Pennsylvania should be entitled to 
determine when that cause of action ceases to exist, especially given that 
neither party is from Mississippi and the accident occurred in Pennsylvania. 
But Mississippi has decided that its limitation period should prevail, so that 
will be the result in a Mississippi court. 
Why is that? The forum interest in following its own rules of procedure 
on questions such as the page limit for briefs is obvious: it is convenient for 
the court to use a single uniform set of procedural rules to govern all 
litigation, and the particular rules the state has chosen for its courts reflect 
its views on, for instance, how many pages parties should be given to make 
their case. But this kind of interest does not exist in Ferens—there is no 
 
146
  Conceivably, Mississippi could aspire to become a magnet for litigation, which might serve the 
interest of the plaintiffs’ bar. But it seems more likely that it simply adhered without much thought to 
the traditional choice-of-law characterization of limitations periods as procedural. 
147
  There are, of course, constitutional limits on the scope of state law, and one could argue that 
they were exceeded in Ferens. If Mississippi claimed to be providing a cause of action under its own tort 
law, the response would be that it was constitutionally impermissible because Mississippi lacks 
sufficient contacts with the case. In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., the Supreme Court 
observed, “We cannot give [a cause of action] longer life in the federal court than it would have had in 
the state court without adding something to the cause of action. We may not do that consistently with 
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins.” 337 U.S. 530, 533–34 (1949). Why does Mississippi have the power to add to 
the Pennsylvania cause of action? 
The answer, such as it is, is that the Supreme Court has said it can. In Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 
U.S. 717 (1988), the Court held that a forum may apply its own longer limitations period to a claim 
based on foreign law, even when it has no contacts with the underlying litigation, if the forum deems 
limitations periods procedural. Id. at 728–29. One might, however, argue that a limitations period is 
substantive in the Byrd sense—that it is part of the state-created definition of the right. In that instance, 
an unrelated forum should not have the power to sever it from the foreign cause of action, or to provide 
that a conflicting longer forum limitations period prevails. Sun Oil does not address this argument. 
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interest of Mississippi courts that is served by hearing a case that could not 
be brought in Pennsylvania.148 
In fact, the Mississippi courts offer no reason—it is simply that they 
characterize the limitations period as procedural and therefore governed by 
forum law.149 So one thing the two-step perspective reveals is that this 
determination of priority is what is actually at stake in a substance–
procedure characterization, at least sometimes. Calling something 
procedural in a choice-of-law analysis is shorthand for the determination 
that it should be controlled by forum law rather than the foreign law that 
creates the cause of action.150 This determination may be relatively 
uncontroversial—if the forum and the foreign state agree that the issue is 
procedural, as they do for page limits, then only forum law purports to 
apply and, as in Erie, only one state’s law reaches the facts. No question of 
priority arises. But if the forum deems an issue procedural while the foreign 
law considers it substantive, there is a conflict between the two laws, each 
of which is intended to apply. The forum may be entitled to decide the issue 
under its own law, but we should not lose sight of the fact that it has done 
so by giving priority to forum law and subordinating foreign law.151 
So Mississippi has made a decision to give its law priority over 
Pennsylvania’s law. It is an odd decision, based apparently more on 
traditional line drawing than any sensible assessment of state interests, but 
it is one the Supreme Court has said is constitutionally permissible. In a 
Mississippi state court, Ferens will not be time-barred. Must a federal court 
in Mississippi reproduce this odd result, with the further consequence that 
Ferens can transfer the case to Pennsylvania and bring the Mississippi 
limitations period with him? 
I think the answer is no. Mississippi has made a decision to give its law 
priority over Pennsylvania’s; this is the point that the two-step perspective 
on substance and procedure revealed. But according to the reading of 
Klaxon set forth above, there is no constitutional requirement for a federal 
court to follow a state’s rules of priority. Nor are the policy-Erie 
considerations particularly weighty. 
Policy Erie has two basic concerns: forum shopping and, as a 
consequence, arbitrary discrimination. The forum-shopping concern is that 
the availability of a different result in federal court will lead parties to 
 
148
  By contrast, dismissing a case that could be brought in Pennsylvania might serve an interest of 
Mississippi courts—that of allocating judicial resources to fresh rather than stale claims. 
149
  See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor Machinery, Inc., 529 So. 2d 606, 609 (Miss. 1988) (“Mississippi 
has always considered statutes of limitation procedural . . . .”). 
150
  It also suggests that the rights created should be limited to the forum’s courts. 
151
  One way of seeing this is to consider the interaction between state and federal law, where the 
Supremacy Clause forbids states from giving their law priority. In obedience to that clause, states 
consistently use federal limitations periods for federal rights. See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 30 & n.137 (2006).   
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choose that forum, and choosing a forum for strategic reasons is generally 
considered undesirable.152 The broader concern about arbitrariness is that 
the availability of the federal forum because of diversity will arbitrarily 
favor parties who want the federal outcome, while similarly situated 
litigants in cases where diversity does not exist cannot obtain it. 
First, as to cases like Ferens itself, forum shopping is probably not 
undesirable. Suppose that the federal court adopts a different rule of priority 
and decides that on these facts the Pennsylvania defense should prevail. 
Deere can remove to federal court if sued in Mississippi state court, and it 
will win on limitations grounds. But that is not a problem, because the 
result in federal court is not simply different; it is better: the reason the 
federal court has adopted a different rule of priority is that Mississippi is 
unreasonably discriminating against foreign law. Protecting individuals 
from that kind of discrimination is one of the purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction.153 
Second, the more general problem of arbitrariness does not exist in the 
same way it did under the Swift regime. Arbitrariness existed under Swift 
because the federal forum (and hence the federal view of the general law) 
was available on a basis (diversity of citizenship) that had nothing to do 
with whether the federal or state view should control. The federal version of 
the general law was available not only in multistate cases where the state 
forum was disrespecting foreign law, but in all cases, even a purely 
intrastate tort (as in Erie), as long as the parties were diverse. 
In Ferens, however—as in any case in which the federal veto over state 
rules of priority would be invoked—the foreign citizenship is quite relevant. 
A federal court departing from the Mississippi rule and giving priority to 
Pennsylvania law would be doing so because Pennsylvania’s connections 
with the case are so much stronger than Mississippi’s that Mississippi’s 
assertion of priority is unreasonable. This approach would sacrifice some 
uniformity: the federal rule of priority would not be available in a suit 
between two Mississippi residents with respect to a Pennsylvania tort 
because that suit would not generate federal diversity jurisdiction. But that 
suit would also look quite different in terms of the reasonableness of 
Mississippi’s claim of priority. That claim would not be unreasonable 
because Mississippi would be the state of both parties’ domicile and so the 
different outcome would not be a troubling disuniformity.154 
 
152
  For a more detailed analysis of forum shopping, see Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 313–14 (1990). 
153
  See Laycock, supra note 89. 
154
  The federal forum would also not be available in a suit between two Pennsylvania residents 
about a Pennsylvania tort, and the disuniformity between that suit and one of a Pennsylvania citizen 
versus a Delaware citizen (such as Ferens) is more troubling. But a Mississippi court in the 
Pennsylvanian-versus-Pennsylvanian case would most likely dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. 
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What does all of this mean? The problem in Ferens, as I intimated 
earlier, is not really that a plaintiff-initiated transfer under § 1404(a) 
preserves the law obtained by the initial choice of forum. It is more that 
Mississippi, by characterizing limitations periods as procedural, claims 
priority for its longer period as against shorter periods under foreign law, 
even when foreign law creates the underlying rights. The two-step model 
shows us that this priority determination is really at stake in substance–
procedure characterization; it gives us a clearer understanding of the 
problem. 
It also shows us the solution, through its interpretation of Klaxon. A 
federal court that follows state rules of scope but departs from unreasonable 
rules of priority can correct unreasonable discrimination against foreign 
law. That is a more appropriate outcome than for it to “play the rule [sic] of 
ventriloquist’s dummy” to the Mississippi state courts.155 
C. Erie’s Progeny: Why the Source of Federal Law Matters 
The two-step model gives us both a deeper understanding of what is 
troubling about the Ferens result and a way to avoid it. The real problem is 
Mississippi’s unreasonable assertion of priority for its limitations period, 
and an independent federal determination of priority provides an 
appropriately limited cure. Additionally, its perspective on substance–
procedure characterization is of use in other cases. I argued above that when 
this characterization is at issue under state law, federal courts should 
understand that characterizing an issue as procedural amounts to placing it 
within the scope of forum law and giving that law priority, a decision that 
may not always be reasonable and can be disregarded in appropriate cases. 
But what about when we are dealing not with choice-of-law 
characterization, but instead with Erie analysis? Here, too, I will argue, 
seeing the substance–procedure characterization in terms of scope and 
priority will clarify matters. 
Erie’s progeny start out conceptualizing the issue in terms of an 
abstract dichotomy between substance and procedure.156 But they quickly 
abandon formalistic line drawing of the sort used by the Mississippi courts 
in Ferens in favor of a more practical approach.157 In Guaranty Trust, the 
Court adopted what has been called the outcome-determinativeness test: in 
order to promote policy Erie, it decided, it would class as substantive any 
rule that might “determine the outcome of a litigation.”158 
 
155
  Richardson v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942). 
156
  See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941) (“The test must be whether a rule really 
regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law 
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them.”). 
157
  The idea that a sharp and meaningful line separates these two categories of law is now generally 
rejected. For a discussion of the relation of the two, see Main, supra note 66, at 812–18. 
158
  326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). 
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But even drawing a substance–procedure line in terms of outcome-
determinativeness will not resolve all the Erie problems—not unless 
outcome-determinativeness marks the outer limit of federal procedural 
lawmaking power, which it does not.159 Federal procedure can overlap with 
state outcome-determinative law; it can even overlap with state law that is 
truly substantive. A state might, for instance, create a cause of action with 
statutory damages but then, in order to prevent annihilative liability, 
provide that those damages are not available in class actions. That is a 
substantive purpose—it is a limit on the claim that is intended to operate in 
any forum—but it overlaps with federal procedural rules about the 
certification of class actions in federal court.160 It is these overlaps that make 
Erie analysis so complicated and confusing. 
Once again, I suggest, the two-step model offers a better way. From 
that perspective, the key Erie questions are simply those of scope and 
priority. Does state law grant rights to the parties, even in a federal court? 
(This question should be answered by inquiring into the state law’s purpose 
and asking whether that purpose will be promoted by its application in 
federal court.) Does federal law grant contrary rights? If so, which should 
prevail? (Federal law will prevail if the federal government wishes it to, but 
it might decide, for policy-Erie reasons, to yield or incorporate.) These 
questions may be hard to answer in some cases, but they are the right ones 
to ask. Next we will apply this understanding to some difficult Erie puzzles. 
1. Statutes and the Constitution vs. Judge-Made Law.—Thinking 
about Erie in terms of scope and priority allows us to make sense of 
perhaps the most puzzling wrinkle that has arisen in the doctrine: the 
differential treatment of federal law depending on its source. If the federal 
law at issue in an Erie analysis is the Constitution, a statute, or a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure, it will be given effect as written. But when the 
federal law is judge made, the outcome is far less certain. In Walker v. 
Armco Steel Corp.,161 for instance, and more recently in Gasperini v. Center 
for Humanities, Inc.,162 federal law made by judges to fill gaps in the Rules 
either gave way (as in Walker) or melded with state law (as in Gasperini). 
Whatever one thinks of the precise result the Court selected (Gasperini 
in particular has drawn its share of criticism163), the pattern is undeniable: 
 
159
  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 469–72 (1965). 
160
  I describe here roughly the facts of Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Insurance 
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010), which I discuss in more detail infra Part III.E. 
161
  446 U.S. 740 (1980). 
162
  518 U.S. 415 (1996). 
163
  See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr. & George Rutherglen, Deforming the Federal Rules: An Essay on 
What’s Wrong with the Recent Erie Decisions, 92 VA. L. REV. 707, 707–18 (2006) (calling Gasperini 
puzzling); C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 
1997 BYU L. REV. 267, 271 (“[N]o careful reading of the Court’s previous decisions or of the policies 
underlying Erie and the Rules of Decision Act could justify the bifurcated approach . . . adopted by the 
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judge-made law gets treated differently. But why? Federal common law, in 
the post-Erie world, is real federal law.164 It creates federal question 
jurisdiction and it can preempt state law just like a federal statute or the 
Constitution.165 Why should it be more yielding in Erie analysis? 
The two-step model provides the answer. A court’s task, on this model, 
is to determine the scope of the two competing laws and assign one priority 
if necessary. The Constitution itself asserts its priority in the Supremacy 
Clause, so if the case falls within its scope—if it creates rights or 
obligations—it must be given priority.166 So too for federal statutes, which 
the Supremacy Clause includes in its list of supreme law: they will always 
take priority over state law, unless Congress directs otherwise.167 The 
qualification is important: the Supremacy Clause gives federal lawmakers 
the power to preempt state law, but of course they can always decline to do 
so, as Congress occasionally has.168 Federal judge-made law differs from 
statutes not in terms of its potential preemptive force, but with respect to 
this decision as to whether or not to assert priority. With statutes, judges 
apply the law but do not make it. Thus, on the issue of priority vis-à-vis 
state law, they must simply enforce the decision Congress has already 
made. With judge-made law, however, they make the law and are free to 
make the priority decision on their own.169 This judicial discretion is 
presumably what the Hanna court had in mind when it referred to “the 
typical, relatively unguided Erie choice” as distinguished from the situation 
where “the court has been instructed” what to do.170 Without legislative 
guidance, the priority determination is a policy decision, and unsurprisingly 
judges have been guided by policy Erie in deciding the extent to which their 
 
majority in Gasperini.”); Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie after Gasperini, 76 TEX. 
L. REV. 1637, 1641 (1998) (“Although the Court’s conclusions are reasonable, the road to them is not 
well lighted.”); Hazard, supra note 129, at 1635 (calling Gasperini “a pitiful attempt”). 
164
  See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the 
ew Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 383, 405 (1964). 
165
  See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98–100 (1972) (“[Section] 1331 
jurisdiction will support claims founded upon federal common law as well as those of a statutory 
origin.”); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 424–27 (1964) (holding that the federal 
common law act of state doctrine has preemptive force). 
166
  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
167
  Id. 
168
  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2006) (disclaiming preemption of state insurance regulation). 
169
  More precisely, this is true of courts the first time they confront the issue, which is when they 
engage in the lawmaking. In subsequent cases, the law and the decision as to its priority have been 
made, and they will presumably follow the earlier decision either as a matter of stare decisis (if it is the 
same court) or binding precedent if a higher court has rendered a decision. Cases like Walker and 
Gasperini are examples of the Supreme Court’s first encounter with the question of the priority of a 
particular judge-made rule vis-à-vis state law. 
170
  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). Congress has indeed given the Court guidance as to 
how to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but I will suggest below that the Court may have 
misunderstood that guidance. See infra Part III.C.2. 
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judge-made rules should displace otherwise-applicable state law. That is 
exactly the reasoning we see in Walker and Gasperini.171 
2. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and State Substantive 
Law.—And what about the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? The 
Court, as noted above, has treated them essentially like statutes, and most 
commentators have too: if a valid Federal Rule is on point, it must be given 
effect.172 A Rule is valid if the matter it regulates is “arguably 
procedural.”173 Hence any Rule that regulates an arguably procedural matter 
will displace contrary state law, regardless of whether the state law would 
be deemed substantive.174 And as a practical matter, first-year students 
learn, you can be pretty confident that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure is 
at least arguably procedural; not one has ever been struck down on the 
grounds that it strayed impermissibly into substance.175 As the Court put it 
in Hanna v. Plumer, when a Federal Rule is on point, “the court has been 
instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the 
Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie 
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the 
Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.”176 
But this is a strange approach, as John Hart Ely and others have noted, 
because it seems to neglect a clearly significant provision of the Rules 
Enabling Act. The “arguably procedural” limit comes from 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2072(a), which gives the Court power to make rules on procedural matters 
but does not mention substantive law.177 The following Section, however, 
adds another limit: the Rules “shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any 
substantive right.”178 This looks like a different kind of restriction. As Ely 
puts it, “The Act therefore contains . . . limitations of both the checklist and 
 
171
  See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430–31 (1996) (discussing Erie’s 
“twin aims”); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752–53 (1980) (noting that policy Erie seeks 
to prevent forum shopping). 
172
  See, e.g., Clark, supra note 38 at 1311 (“[W]hen Congress . . . adopts a federal rule on 
point . . . the only question for the judiciary is whether the particular rule falls within Congress’s 
constitutional power to enact. If so, the Supremacy Clause instructs courts to follow the federal rule 
notwithstanding contrary state law, whether characterized as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural.’” (footnote 
omitted)). 
173
  Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
174
  Id. at 472 (majority opinion). 
175
  Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 163, at 739. 
176
  380 U.S. at 471. 
177
  28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2006) (“The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules 
of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district courts (including 
proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.”). 
178
  Id. § 2072(b). 
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enclave variety.”179 Not only is the Court’s power limited in scope to 
procedural matters (the checklist), but within that scope, certain areas are 
carved out (the enclave)—subsection (b) says that even procedural rules are 
not to affect substantive rights. 
Why should this language be ignored? One answer might be that the 
“arguably procedural” test actually incorporates the requirements of 
subsection (b) as well as those of subsection (a).180 If a Rule is procedural, 
this argument goes, then ipso facto it will not modify substantive rights; 
subsection (b) is mere surplusage. This argument would be sound if 
substance and procedure were mutually exclusive, nonoverlapping 
categories into which rules could be placed by abstract, context-independent 
analysis. But they are not; that view is exactly what sophisticated legal 
minds have been rejecting since at least the 1930s.181 And given that federal 
procedural law can in fact overlap with state substantive law,182 the 
“arguably procedural” test works only to ensure that the rule falls within the 
“checklist” restriction of authority to procedural matters. As to the 
“enclave” restriction, Hanna’s invocation of the Advisory Committee, 
Congress, and the Court begs the question. None of those entities is in a 
position to decide whether applying the rule in a particular case will modify 
a substantive right, for the obvious reason that they have no way to foresee 
that case. 
Another possibility is that whatever benefits the first sentence of 
subsection (b) grant to state law are undone by the next sentence, which 
provides that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further 
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.”183 But this sentence is 
 
179
  Ely, supra note 37, at 719. By “checklist” limitation, Ely means the grant of a limited power 
akin to the enumerated powers of Congress. By “enclave,” he means something carved out from within a 
limited power. 
180
  See Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1108 
(1982). Burbank suggests that since Erie was still four years away, federalism was not on the drafters’ 
minds. Id. at 1109–10. But the revolution of 1935, with its acceptance of vastly greater federal power, 
was also a year away, and constitutional “enclave” federalism still had vitality. See Ely, supra note 37, 
at 701–02. Given that the Court was protecting state enclaves against congressional legislation, 
subsection (b) might have been understood to reaffirm the existence of similar enclaves against Court 
rulemaking. Burbank quotes the drafter’s transmission letter as describing it as reaffirming that 
“Congress could not if it wanted to, confer upon the Supreme Court, legislative power,” which seems 
consistent with this reading. See Burbank, supra, at 1073 & n.260 (quoting Letter from the Hon. Albert 
B. Cummins to the Hon. William H. Taft (Dec. 17, 1923) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
181
  See Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 
333, 334–35 (1933); Main, supra note 66. The drafters of the Rules Enabling Act may have subscribed 
to this dichotomy, but that does not necessarily mean that we must try to adhere to a conceptual structure 
that no longer fits the facts as we see them. It is also faithful interpretation to make sense of the statutory 
language while recognizing that certain presuppositions of the drafters have proved false. See generally 
Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Context in Interpretive Theory, 110 HARV. 
L. REV. 1785 (1997) (discussing the effects of changed context on interpretation). 
182
  See supra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
183
  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b). 
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most naturally read to be not about the interaction of the Rules with state 
law but instead about their interaction with federal laws. It affirms, as might 
otherwise not be clear, that valid Rules can displace prior inconsistent 
federal statutes—unlike, say, agency regulations, which cannot.184 But it 
cannot easily be read to be about preempting state law, because Congress 
surely did not intend the Rules to preempt state laws in state court, which 
would be the consequence of rendering them “of no further force or effect.” 
The most likely answer is instead that taking subsection (b) at face 
value seems to eviscerate the Rules,185 or at least to place them at the mercy 
of even a single state. If a Rule that modifies a substantive right is invalid, 
then it seems that a single state could void a Rule by enacting a substantive 
law in conflict with it—void the Rule, that is, in the sense that it could not 
be applied even in states without such conflicting laws, or in federal 
question cases. That result is surely intolerable, but it seems to be the 
consequence of taking subsection (b) at face value. And because taking 
subsection (b) seriously leads to such odd results, it is better to ignore it 
entirely. 
Or so people seem to think.186 But once again, the two-step perspective 
shows that there is another alternative. We can read the Enabling Act’s 
restriction as a statement about priority. The Federal Rules, the Act says on 
this reading, should not be given priority if they conflict with “substantive” 
law (which I would read as law intended to give rights regardless of forum). 
This selective subordination of a rule is not at all the same thing as voiding 
it entirely. The Rule would yield when faced with contrary substantive law. 
But it would still have effect in federal question cases, and also in other 
diversity cases where no state substantive right stood in its way.187 
 
184
  Indeed, this is how the Supreme Court has read it. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10 
(1941) (stating that the procedural rules that this Court promulgates, “if they are within the authority 
granted by Congress, repeal” a prior inconsistent procedural statute). 
185
  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473–74 (1965) (“To hold that a Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure must cease to function whenever it alters the mode of enforcing state-created rights would be 
to disembowel either the Constitution’s grant of power over federal procedure or Congress’ attempt to 
exercise that power in the Enabling Act.”). 
186
  See, e.g., Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 163, at 738, 741 (describing the “central insight in 
Hanna” as “that the validity of a federal rule should be determined as a general matter, not through case-
by-case reconsideration of whether in a specific context it ‘abridge[d], enlarge[d] or modif[ied] any 
substantive right’” and suggesting that if a challenge to a federal rule were to succeed, “the rule (or some 
severable provision within it) would be held invalid in its entirety and the task of revising the rule and 
narrowing its scope would be returned to the rulemaking process” (alterations in original) (quoting 
§ 2072(b)). 
187
  This lack of uniformity would come at some cost in terms of judicial workload. See Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1447 (2010) (plurality opinion) 
(arguing that case-specific analysis would be too costly). But it seems to be the most straightforward 
reading of the text. In Shady Grove itself, five Justices seemed to endorse the independent significance 
of the “shall not abridge” language, though they never formed a majority for this proposition. Id. at 
1452–53 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1463–64 & n.2 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). 
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This is in fact close to the result the Court has reached in those cases 
where it has read a rule narrowly to avoid a conflict with state law, such as 
Walker, and arguably Gasperini and Semtek as well. In those cases, “the 
Court gave a Federal Rule an artificially narrow reading to avoid a conflict 
with state law on state claims but preserved a literal reading of the rule for 
federal claims.”188 Dudley and Rutherglen, like most other commentators, 
suggest that this must be wrong—the decisions giving the Rule one 
meaning in diversity actions and another in federal question ones “cannot 
stand together.”189 But this simply fails to see the consequence of the two-
step model. It is true that a Federal Rule should not be interpreted 
differently in a diversity case than in a federal question case.190 But the Rule 
might well have a different effect if in one case it encounters a state 
substantive right and in the other it does not.191 Thus, thinking about the 
significance of the source of federal law from the perspective of the two-
step model offers several benefits. It explains why judge-made law is 
different from statutory law for Erie analysis: because judges are 
empowered to make the priority decision with respect to the former but not 
the latter. It gives a clearer view of how to give meaning to the whole of the 
Rules Enabling Act: give priority to state substantive law when it conflicts 
with federal procedure. And it supports the Court’s practice of giving Rules 
different effect in diversity cases and federal question cases: this can be 
understood as giving priority to state substantive law as subsection (b) of 
the Enabling Act directs, not as giving the Rules a different meaning. 
D. The Class Action Fairness Act 
Enacted in 2005, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)192 
grants federal jurisdiction over, and hence allows removal of, class actions 
where minimal diversity exists between the opposing parties and the 
amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.193 Federal courts hearing such 
cases must frequently deal with the interaction of choice of law and the 
 
188
  Dudley & Rutherglen, supra note 163, at 736. 
189
  Id. at 735–36. 
190
  See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 n.9 (1980); Dudley & Rutherglen, supra 
note 163, at 734–36. 
191
  Consider by way of comparison a state law that in one case is the only potentially applicable law 
and in another is preempted by federal law. Its effect in the two cases will certainly be different, but this 
is not because the state law has been interpreted differently or means one thing in one case but 
something different in the other. 
192
  Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (2006)). 
193
  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). Other subsections of § 1332 withdraw minor elements of this 
grant. See, e.g., id. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (excluding classes in which at least two-thirds of plaintiffs and all 
primary defendants are citizens of the state in which the action was filed). 
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class action form.194 The primary significance of choice of law for class 
actions is that courts often rely on choice-of-law analysis to decline to 
certify a nationwide class. If different class members’ claims would be 
governed by different states’ laws, courts frequently conclude that the suit 
fails to meet the predominance requirement of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23(b): if multiple states’ laws will be used, common issues will 
not predominate over individualized ones.195 
How should federal courts deal with choice of law in the class action 
setting? The most obvious answer is that they should do whatever state 
courts would do, on the grounds that this is what Klaxon directs. There is, I 
will suggest, considerable merit to this obvious response. But it is also 
incomplete in some important respects, and to get a fuller answer we need 
to think about the practice in state courts before CAFA and what its drafters 
hoped to achieve. 
We may conveniently start with the latter. CAFA’s “Findings and 
Purposes” section opens with the statement that “[c]lass action lawsuits are 
an important and valuable part of the legal system when they permit the fair 
and efficient resolution of legitimate claims of numerous parties . . .”196 But 
it is relatively clear that CAFA’s drafters came not to praise class actions 
but to bury them. There follows a litany of complaints about alleged 
“abuses of the class action device that have—(A) harmed class members 
with legitimate claims and defendants that have acted responsibly; (B) 
adversely affected interstate commerce; and (C) undermined public respect 
for our judicial system.”197 In particular, subsection (a)(4) observes:  
State and local courts are—(A) keeping cases of national importance out of 
Federal court; (B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-
of-State defendants; and (C) making judgments that impose their view of the 
law on other States and bind the rights of the residents of those States.198  
CAFA provides federal jurisdiction, the findings and purpose section 
concludes, to “restore the intent of the framers of the United States 
Constitution by providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases 
of national importance under diversity jurisdiction.”199 
 
194
  See generally Silberman, supra note 90 (analyzing the role of choice of law in selecting a forum 
to hear a class action and the effect of choice of law on interstate forum shopping in nationwide class 
litigation). 
195
  See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002) (“No class 
action is proper unless all litigants are governed by the same legal rules. Otherwise the class cannot 
satisfy the commonality and superiority requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), (b)(3).”). 
196
  Class Action Fairness Act § 2(a)(1). 
197
  Id. § 2(a)(2)(A)–(C). 
198
  Id. § 2(a)(4)(A)–(C). 
199
  Id. § 2(b)(2). 
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To what extent were these concerns grounded in reality?200 It is true 
that prior to CAFA, state courts did sometimes decide that a single state’s 
law could govern a nationwide class action, while federal courts had grown 
increasingly hostile to the practice.201 But to decide whether the state courts 
were acting abusively, we need a more fine-grained analysis. In particular, 
it is worth distinguishing between three possibilities. 
First, if a Kansas court announces that it will decide a nationwide class 
action under Kansas law when the only contact is that some plaintiffs are 
from Kansas and were injured there—such that some other claims have 
absolutely no connection to the state—it has clearly behaved badly. 
Deciding that Kansas law will govern all the claims is an unconstitutional 
power grab by Kansas, projecting its law into cases where it has no 
authority. Second, if a Kansas court announces that it will decide a 
nationwide class action under Nebraska law when the only contact is that 
some plaintiffs are from Nebraska and were injured there, it is still behaving 
badly. It is violating the Constitution by deciding claims that have no 
connection to Nebraska under Nebraska law. The decision does not, 
however, look like a power grab by Kansas;202 the problem is that Nebraska 
law is arbitrary with respect to claims that have no contact to Nebraska. 
Third and last, if a Kansas court announces that it will decide a nationwide 
class action under Iowa law when Iowa is the defendant’s principal place of 
business, or where the design or manufacture of a defective product took 
place, the Kansas court is quite likely not behaving badly. It has not 
violated the Constitution by deciding claims under the law of a state with no 
connection to the underlying facts, and it has not made a grab for power by 
unreasonably elevating its own law over that of other states. 
To read CAFA’s findings, you would think that state-court certification 
of nationwide classes followed the first of these three patterns—the 
unconstitutional power grab. But in fact that sort of thing has not gone on 
since the Supreme Court pronounced it unconstitutional in Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.203 Instead, decisions announcing that all claims will 
be subject to a single law uniformly follow the third pattern: they choose 
 
200
  Stephen Burbank characterizes the findings and statement of purpose as either “window 
dressing” or “bullshit.” Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic Uses of 
Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1924, 1942 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
201
  Compare Bridgestone/Firestone, 288 F.3d at 1015 (refusing to certify class on choice-of-law 
grounds), with Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 81 P.3d 618, 627–29 (Okla. 2003) (certifying 
nationwide class under Michigan law). 
202
  At least not in the sense of asserting priority for its law. If Kansas makes itself a magnet forum 
for class actions, it has grabbed power in a different sense, which may be objectionable but is not the 
focus of this Article. 
203
  472 U.S. 797, 821–22 (1985). 
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the law of the defendant’s principal place of business or the state where the 
defendant engaged in some relevant act.204 
What is wrong with that? The main objection is that a court doing this 
may be reaching a different choice-of-law result for a class action because it 
is a class action, or engaging in what Richard Nagareda called 
“bootstrapping.”205 That is, the court might decide that a single state’s law 
should govern the entire action when, had the claims been brought 
individually, it would have decided them under multiple different laws.206 
On its face, this might seem bad. The principle that the procedural 
device of the class action should not alter substantive rights has significant 
intuitive appeal.207 In federal courts, it seems a plausible consequence of the 
Rules Enabling Act’s admonition that the Federal Rules should not alter 
substantive rights.208 And a state court that disregards it might fairly be 
described as abusive if by so doing it deprives a defendant of the benefits of 
law it could have asserted against an individual suit. 
But matters are a little more complex than that. To understand how 
choice of law works in a class action, we need to go back to the two-step 
model. Suppose we are dealing with a multistate products liability case. The 
defendant, operating in its principal place of business in Iowa, has 
manufactured goods that are then shipped and sold nationwide, and cause 
injuries in all of the states where they are purchased. And, for simplicity’s 
sake, let us assume that the injured parties purchase the products and are 
injured in their domiciliary states, and that choice of law is the only 
possible obstacle to certification. Plaintiffs seek to certify a nationwide 
class. How should this be analyzed? 
The first step is to ask which states’ laws give the parties rights. Iowa 
law probably gives the plaintiffs a cause of action. It is not constitutionally 
required to do so, and statutory language or judicial construction might 
indicate that it does not (the statute might, for instance, specify that it 
applies “to all goods purchased in this state,” or courts might have so 
construed it). But states typically do assert an interest in regulating the 
behavior of their corporate domiciliaries, even when the immediate 
 
204
  See, e.g., Ysbrand, 81 P.3d at 625–26 (law of defendant’s principal place of business); David 
Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of Diversity 
Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1283 (2007) (noting that when courts choose a single 
state’s law to apply to all class members’ claims, it is usually the law of the defendant’s principal place 
of business or the law of the state where a product was manufactured or designed). 
205
  See Richard A. Nagareda, Bootstrapping in Choice of Law After the Class Action Fairness Act, 
74 UMKC L. REV. 661, 661 (2006). 
206
  Id. at 661–62. 
207
  See Kramer, supra note 123, at 572 (“Stated this way, the point seems both obvious and 
irrefutable.”). 
208
  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
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consequences of that behavior are felt out of state.209 (In products liability 
cases, for instance, states might want to ensure that local companies that 
follow good design and manufacture practices are not forced out of business 
by competition from those that do not.) Likewise, Iowa will give the 
defendant a defense—it presumably has an interest in seeing that the local 
defendant is not subjected to any greater liability than local law deems 
appropriate. 
What about the plaintiffs’ home state laws? As the place of injury and 
plaintiffs’ domicile, these states surely give the plaintiffs causes of action. 
And again, correlatively, they will probably give the defendant a defense 
against greater liability (I will discuss this issue in more detail later). This 
first step of the two-step analysis lets us see clearly what is wrong with the 
two unconstitutional practices mentioned above (the Kansas court deciding 
all claims against an Iowa manufacturer under either Kansas or Nebraska 
law). In each case, the court would be deciding some claims under laws that 
do not, in fact, grant the plaintiffs any rights. (Neither Kansas nor Nebraska 
law has anything to say, for instance, about a Kentucky plaintiff injured in 
Kentucky by the Iowa manufacturer’s product.210) 
So the first step of the two-step model can give us a better 
understanding of why courts cannot do what the Supreme Court has already 
forbidden—apply a single state’s law when some class members’ claims 
have no connection to that state. To figure out what is permissible, we need 
to move on to the second step. The court must decide whether these various 
rights (the claims and defenses) conflict, and if so, which is to be given 
priority. The class will be certifiable if the court decides that claims from a 
single state (which must be Iowa, as that is the only state that gives claims 
to all plaintiffs) should prevail over any defenses the defendant can assert. 
The possible defenses are those created by the plaintiffs’ home laws. 
Of course, the defendant can also invoke defenses from Iowa law, but 
because that law creates the plaintiffs’ claims, those defenses do not create 
any problem of disuniformity that would threaten class certification. Here 
we need to distinguish two possibilities. A plaintiff’s home law (or a 
particular aspect of that law) might be more plaintiff-friendly or it might be 
more defendant-friendly. That is, it might grant the plaintiff rights beyond 
what the Iowa law does (treble damages, say, or the availability of 




  See, e.g., State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 667 P.2d 1304, 1312 (Ariz. 1983) (“Indeed, it would 
appear that the state has a legitimate interest in redressing the wrongs committed from within Arizona. 
There is a moral imperative to provide redress for those injured.”). 
210
  Interestingly, this constitutional problem is exactly the same problem that existed in Erie: 
deciding a claim under a law that does not create rights or obligations. See supra text accompanying 
note 49. 
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In the former case, the two-step perspective tells us something very 
important that the traditional view of choice of law obscures. When the 
plaintiff’s home law is more plaintiff-friendly, there is in fact no choice-of-
law question presented. Such a plaintiff has a variety of rights that she 
could assert, some under her home state’s law and some under Iowa law. As 
master of her complaint, she is entitled to assert whichever ones she wants, 
just as she would be entitled to choose to pursue a tort theory rather than a 
contract one, or one of several different causes of action available. If she 
wants to assert claims under Iowa law because that allows class 
certification, rather than claims under her home state’s law, that is a 
permissible choice—and it is more election of remedies than choice of law. 
So if plaintiffs whose home state’s laws are more plaintiff-friendly 
wish to assert claims under Iowa law in order to join a class action, choice 
of law should be no obstacle.211 This is, as I said, an insight that the 
conventional understanding of choice of law obscures because rather than 
asking which rights the plaintiff wants to assert, it would simply try to 
decide which state’s law applies.212 It is also an example of the choice-of-
law analysis coming out differently because of the class action device. If 
these claims were litigated individually, plaintiffs with more favorable 
home law would presumably want to pursue those claims rather than 
proceed under Iowa law, and a court might find that the rights created by 
the plaintiffs’ home laws should prevail. Thus, those claims would be 
decided under the plaintiffs’ home laws if brought individually, but under 
Iowa law in a class action. But, importantly, it is not an impermissible form 
of bootstrapping: what has changed is not the court’s analysis of the scope 
or priority of state-created rights, but rather the plaintiff’s litigation 
strategy. 
What about the other possibility, where the plaintiff’s home state’s law 
is more favorable to the defendant? One might simply say that these 
defenses are not available to the defendant. The plaintiff’s home state must 
surely offer them so far as claims under its law are concerned. If, for 
instance, the plaintiff seeks to recover under Kansas products liability law, 
the defenses under that law must be available to an Iowa defendant 
manufacturer—Kansas cannot withhold rights under its law simply because 
a defendant hails from another state.213 But it is not obvious that Kansas is 
required to give those defenses to an Iowa manufacturer in order to relieve 
 
211
  There are some slightly difficult questions here about whether joining a nationwide class and 
forgoing their home-state law claims is in the best interest of these plaintiffs—after all, they might be 
able to pursue a single-state class action. But these questions are actually relatively familiar from the 
class action context—they are analogous to those posed by a subset of plaintiffs who have additional 
claims that would be relinquished by joining the class. They are not choice-of-law questions. 
212
  I believe that framing the choice-of-law question this way—as “what law applies?”—is 
responsible for a significant portion of the confusion attending the field of conflict of laws. See 
Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 6, at 1887–88. 
213
  See Roosevelt, Myth, supra note 6, at 2512. 
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it of liability that Iowa law imposes. And because doing so would simply 
disfavor an injured Kansas domiciliary, one might conclude that Kansas 
policy would be to withhold those defenses.214 If so, there is no conflict of 
rights here either, in which case certification of a class under the 
defendant’s home law would be almost always appropriate. 
However, that might not be the best interpretation of Kansas law. It 
might also be the case that Kansas offers defendants various protections not 
just to encourage companies to manufacture goods in Kansas (the obvious 
reason for defendant-friendly products liability laws), but also to encourage 
out-of-state companies to ship goods into Kansas. That purpose would be 
served by granting the Kansas defenses to an Iowa manufacturer, and even 
by granting them again against Iowa claims. 
Then we would have what modern choice-of-law theorists call a true 
conflict: each state’s law grants rights, the rights conflict, and the court 
must give one priority. If the court decided that the Iowa law should get 
priority, the class could still be certified and all claims could be decided 
under Iowa law. If it decided that the plaintiff’s home state’s law should get 
priority, plaintiffs from that state would not be able to join the class. And 
this is where the possibility of questionable bootstrapping arises: in making 
this priority decision, a court might change its analysis because the case was 
brought as a class action. It might, that is, decide to give priority to Iowa 
law for the class action even though it would have given priority to the 
plaintiff’s home state law in an individual suit.215 
Thus, we must consider CAFA’s effect on three possible scenarios: 
• The state court, not engaging in bootstrapping, would decline 
to certify the class on the grounds that some claims should be 
decided under the plaintiffs’ home laws—that is, it would 
decide that the defenses given by those laws were available to 
the defendant and should prevail over rights under Iowa law; 
• The state court, not engaging in bootstrapping, would certify 
the class on the grounds that all claims should be decided 
under Iowa law—that is, it would decide either that defenses 
under the plaintiffs’ home laws were not available to the Iowa 
defendant, or that Iowa rights should take priority; 
• The state court would certify the class because it engaged in 
bootstrapping to decide that all claims should be governed by 
Iowa law—that is, although in an individual case it would 
 
214
  See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing idea 
that state has an interest in preventing recovery by a domiciliary as “pure fancy”). 
215
  Nagareda, supra note 205, at 672–75, argues persuasively that state courts tend to do this by 
finding that the defendant’s principal place of business stands out as compared to the many other states 
implicated in a class action—a line of reasoning obviously not available in individual cases. 
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have given priority to the plaintiff’s home law, it would give 
priority to Iowa law because the case is a class action. 
How should these cases come out if removed to federal court under 
CAFA? The first case is easy. It is also somewhat unlikely to make it to 
federal court—if the state court will refuse to certify a class, and the 
defendant can foresee that outcome, there is no reason to remove it. But if 
such a case does wind up in federal court, the federal judge should follow 
his state counterpart and also decline certification. The state court has 
decided to give the plaintiffs’ home laws priority over Iowa law. I have 
argued that federal courts are independent on priority questions, but for 
policy-Erie reasons, they should usually follow state rules of priority.216 
This situation provides no reason to depart from that general rule. 
The second case, where the state court would certify without 
bootstrapping, is a little more complicated. The immediate response might 
be that this is a choice-of-law decision, and Klaxon tells federal courts 
facing choice-of-law issues to follow the courts of the states in which they 
sit—hence the federal court should also certify the class. But a more precise 
analysis discloses several wrinkles. For one thing—and this is one of 
CAFA’s very significant effects—it might be the case that state-
certification requirements are more lenient than those of Rule 23.217 In some 
substantial number of cases, classes that would have been certified under 
state procedure will fail the more demanding test of Federal Rule 23.218 
That is a significant effect, and it must be noted, but it is not a choice-
of-law issue. So what about the choice-of-law based certifications? Should 
the federal court follow the state court and certify the class on the grounds 
that every claim can be decided under Iowa law? 
There are, I said, two different ways the state court could have reached 
this conclusion. First, it might decide that the defendant simply cannot 
claim rights under the plaintiffs’ home law, because it believes that those 
states do not intend to grant rights to such defendants. If this decision is 
correct, then the federal court should also certify the class. This, again, is 
the same kind of situation as Erie itself: Iowa law grants the plaintiffs a 
cause of action and no other state’s law grants the defendant defenses, so 
Iowa law is the only law under which the claims can be decided. But how 
do we know that the decision is correct? The state court is not determining 
the scope of its own law (on which it is authoritative); it is determining the 
scope of other states’ laws. On that question it is not authoritative, and the 
 
216
  See supra text accompanying notes 97–109. 
217
  Under Arkansas law, for instance, courts are not required to perform a choice-of-law analysis 
before certifying a nationwide class. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 285 S.W.3d 634, 641 (Ark. 
2008). 
218
  In Arkansas, for instance, any case that could not be certified because different class members’ 
claims will be governed by different laws will not be certified in federal court but will—assuming it 
meets the other requirements—in state court. 
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federal court might believe that the state court has made a mistake in its 
construction of the other states’ policies. What should it do then? 
There are policy-Erie reasons to follow the state court anyway, but 
they are not as weighty as policy Erie usually is. In the ordinary case, the 
policy-Erie point that offering a different result in federal court is unfairly 
favorable to the out-of-stater who can invoke diversity jurisdiction is 
supported by two considerations: the inherent unfairness of giving out-of-
staters the possibility of different results in federal court, and the lack of 
any federal interest or other good reason for doing so. But in this case there 
is a good reason: the federal court thinks that the state court has gotten 
sister-state law wrong. Whether this reason should be weighty enough is 
hard to say—it depends on how blatant the state court’s error is, and most 
times the desire for uniformity will probably prevail. In some 
circumstances, though, a mistaken construction of sister-state law might be 
severe enough that it should not be followed in federal court. 
The second reason that a state court might certify the hypothetical class 
under Iowa law is that, without bootstrapping, it has decided that although 
the rights created by Iowa law conflict with those created by the laws of the 
plaintiffs’ home states, Iowa law should get priority. Should the federal 
court follow this determination? 
This is a relatively straightforward Klaxon question: should a federal 
court follow state rules of priority? I’ve said already that while federal 
courts are independent on questions of priority (which they are not on 
questions of scope), policy Erie will ordinarily suggest that they should 
follow their state counterparts. Exceptions might arise when a state is 
unreasonably discriminatory in giving priority to its law over foreign law, 
but that situation does not exist in this hypothetical. Most suits would 
presumably be brought in states other than Iowa, so forum law would not 
get priority, and even for suits brought in Iowa, the priority determination 
would be reasonable. So in an ordinary diversity suit, the federal court 
should follow the state court and certify the class. 
Does CAFA change the analysis? Congress clearly has the power 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to tell federal courts to follow 
different rules of priority.219 And in enacting CAFA, Congress did seem to 
hope for some federal departures from state court practice.220 But in the text 
of the statute, it identified the occasions for such departures very much in 
terms of the unfair discrimination I have mentioned: state courts exhibiting 
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  See, e.g., Gottesman, supra note 109, at 23 (“Scholars are virtually unanimous in their view that 
Congress has the power to enact federal choice of law statutes.”). 
220
  The Senate Report on CAFA spoke disparagingly of state court decisions that certified 
nationwide classes under a single law and noted approvingly federal court decisions that refused to do 
so. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 23–27, 63–64 (2005) (“By enabling federal courts to hear more class 
actions, this bill will help minimize the class action abuses taking place in state courts and ensure that 
these cases can be litigated in a proper forum.”). 
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“bias against out-of-state defendants” and “impos[ing] their view of the law 
on other States.”221 Those seem like fairly clear references to certifying 
classes under forum law and disregarding foreign defenses. Certifying 
classes under the law of the defendant’s home state, especially when it is 
the not the forum, does not seem to raise the problems Congress listed. So 
CAFA should not make a difference here: if a state court, without 
bootstrapping, would certify the class under the defendant’s home law, a 
federal court should too—or at least, it should not decline to do so on 
choice-of-law grounds.222 
What happens when a state court bootstraps? In the absence of CAFA, 
it is not clear what a federal court should do. On the one hand, for a federal 
court to bootstrap on its own initiative seems wrong, as Larry Kramer has 
argued.223 Federal procedural rules are not supposed to change the parties’ 
substantive rights, and changing rules of priority because a case is filed as a 
class action seems to do just that. On the other hand, if a federal court 
bootstraps because the state court would, it is state law and not federal 
procedure that is changing the substantive rights. So the federal prohibition 
against modifying substantive rights would not stand as a barrier. 
But perhaps there is another obstacle. When a state court bootstraps, 
state procedural law is modifying the parties’ substantive rights. The state 
rule for certification, the analog of Federal Rule 23, is being understood, at 
least implicitly, to authorize the court to depart from the choice-of-law 
analysis it would use if the claims were presented individually—to give 
priority to claims under the defendant’s home law. But the Rules Enabling 
Act tells a federal court following Federal Rule 23 not to do this—not to 
alter the parties’ substantive rights for procedural reasons such as the 
existence of a class action.224 So already there is a real tension between 
Klaxon and the Enabling Act. 
Bring CAFA into the picture, and the matter becomes clearer. 
Congress was plainly concerned that state courts were certifying too many 
class actions, and it plainly was hoping that fewer would be certified in 
federal court.225 This is perhaps best understood as a limited repeal of policy 
Erie: in some cases, Congress appears to be saying, there is a good enough 
reason for federal courts to reach different results than state courts. What 
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  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(B)–(C), 119 Stat. 4, 5 (codified 
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
222
  One could, of course, respond that CAFA’s drafters plainly hoped to take advantage of federal 
judges’ relative distaste for class actions, and that the findings and statements of purpose are 
disingenuous. See Burbank, supra note 200. But that attempt to change results through judicial 
predilection rather than statutory direction is deeply contrary to the spirit of Erie, see Marcus, supra note 
204, at 1310–12, and hewing close to CAFA’s stated justifications is an appropriate response. 
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  See Kramer, supra note 123, at 549. 
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  28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006). 
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  See supra text accompanying notes 220–21. 
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kind of cases? The text of the statute identifies some problems that do not 
really exist in state court practice, but we can infer an antipathy to changing 
choice-of-law analysis in order to facilitate certification. Given the doubt 
about whether a federal court should follow a bootstrapping state court at 
all, CAFA is a good enough reason to go the other way.226 
Here the two-step model shows us the best form of the argument for 
certification under the defendant’s home law: that this law creates a cause 
of action for the plaintiffs, who can, if they wish, waive more generous 
remedies offered by their own states’ laws, or that the defendant’s home 
law should prevail in a conflict with more defendant-friendly laws from the 
plaintiffs’ home states. It also shows us what it would mean for a federal 
court to depart from state choice-of-law analysis: the federal court would be 
making a different decision as to the relative priority to be given to the 
defendant’s and plaintiffs’ home laws. Last, it explains when this departure 
would be appropriate: when the state court would certify the class only 
because it has engaged in bootstrapping. 
E. Shady Grove v. Allstate 
The Supreme Court’s most recent venture into the Erie arena concerns 
not CAFA’s fear of permissive certification practice in state courts, but 
actually the reverse: a claim that could not be heard as a class action in a 
state court but could—the Court concluded—in federal court.227 Shady 
Grove Orthopedic Associates sued Allstate Insurance in federal court for 
failing to pay an insurance claim on time.228 In such cases, New York 
insurance law entitles insured parties to statutory interest of two percent 
monthly.229 Shady Grove alleged that untimely payments were Allstate’s 
practice and sought certification of a class of all persons to whom Allstate 
owed interest.230 
New York Civil Practice Law section 901(b) provides that an action to 
recover statutory damages “may not be maintained as a class action.”231 The 
question in Shady Grove was whether this New York rule prevented 
certification in federal court, or whether it should be deemed supplanted by 
the requirements of Federal Rule 23(b).232 
 
226
  See Nagareda, supra note 205, at 683–85. 
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  See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1437 (2010) 
(plurality opinion). For another attempt to analyze this case from a choice-of-law perspective, see Joseph 
P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections on the Erie Doctrine from a Conflicts 
Perspective, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 939 (2011).   
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  Id. at 1436 n.1 (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 
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  Id. at 1437–38. 
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The Court fragmented badly on that issue. Justice Scalia, joined by 
Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Sotomayor, found a “direct collision” 
between Rule 23 and section 901(b) and argued that in such case, the 
Federal Rule should prevail unless it was invalid under the Rules Enabling 
Act—a question to be determined by looking only at the Rule and asking 
whether it regulated procedure.233 This four-Justice plurality found the Rule 
valid under that test and held that it preempted section 901(b): the class 
could be certified.234 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and 
Alito in dissent, wanted to give independent significance to the Rules 
Enabling Act’s prohibition on the modification of substantive rights. 
Relying on choice-of-law theory, she would have adopted a moderate 
interpretation of Rule 23 and held that the class could not be certified to the 
extent that it sought statutory damages.235 
Justice Stevens, writing alone in concurrence, agreed with Justice 
Ginsburg that the Enabling Act’s “shall not abridge” language should be 
given independent force.236 But because he thought the New York law did 
not deal with substantive rights, he agreed with Justice Scalia’s disposition 
of the case and provided a fifth vote for certification.237 
Shady Grove is a hard case to read in terms of its precedential 
significance. Justice Stevens joined the part of Scalia’s opinion finding a 
direct conflict between Rule 23 and section 901(b), but he also seemed to 
disavow that part’s claim that a Rule’s validity is an all-or-nothing affair.238 
Justice Ginsburg, for her part, argued in a footnote that “a majority of this 
Court . . . agrees that Federal Rules should be read with moderation in 
diversity suits to accommodate important state concerns.”239 How the Court 
will read the Enabling Act in the future seems an open question, especially 
given the replacement of Justice Stevens by Justice Kagan. 
Analytically, however, the case is actually relatively easy. The Justices 
split 5–4 over whether to give independent significance to the Rules 
Enabling Act’s “shall not abridge” language, with five agreeing that they 
should240: if section 901(b) was about the scope of substantive rights, Rule 
23 would be forced to accommodate it. On the question of whether 
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section 901(b) was substantive, however, Justice Stevens split from the four 
dissenters, giving Justice Scalia a fifth vote for the disposition.241 
But even the 5–4 split over the Rules Enabling Act probably amounts 
to less than it seems in terms of underlying principles. We may see this by 
considering two different statutes that the New York legislature might have 
written. First, they could have written an unambiguously substantive one. 
Into each statute providing for statutory damages, they could have added a 
section providing, “Because these damages exist to provide an incentive for 
individual suits, they shall not be available to any plaintiff proceeding via a 
class action.” Certainly the four dissenters and Justice Stevens would not 
have found a conflict between this statute and Rule 23, and most likely the 
four-Justice plurality would not have found a conflict either.242 Rule 23 does 
not purport to create remedies independent of those available under state 
law, and it is unlikely that either the Rules Enabling Act or the Constitution 
would allow it to do so. Shady Grove’s class action might proceed, but it 
would be limited to actual damages and hence would likely not meet 
CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement. 
On the other hand, the legislature might have written an 
unambiguously procedural statute, a general provision stating, “Because 
class actions are burdensome for courts, no class action seeking statutory 
damages may be maintained in the courts of this state.” Here again there 
would clearly be no conflict between Rule 23 and the state law, though the 
result would be that the class action seeking statutory damages would be 
allowed in federal court. 
Which of these statutes was the legislature trying to write? Or did it 
have both a procedural and a substantive purpose in mind? How to construe 
this particular statute is not the main focus of this Article, though I think 
that Justice Ginsburg has the better of the argument. It is easy to see why 
the legislature might have wanted to exclude statutory damages from class 
actions: the effect of multiplying those damages across the class could 
produce annihilative liability. It is much harder to see why they might have 
wanted to allow such damages but exclude the actions from New York 
courts: there is nothing procedurally objectionable about them. 
My main point is that thinking about these possibilities in terms of the 
two-step model brings more analytical clarity. Regardless of which statute 
the New York legislature intended to write, the case, like Erie itself, 
presents a false conflict: a situation where the relevant issue falls within the 
lawmaking power of only one sovereign. If the statute limits the recovery 
available to class action plaintiffs, then it is about the definition of rights 
under New York law, something within the sole authority of New York.243 
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If it is about requirements for class certification, then New York law 
controls in New York courts and Rule 23 controls in federal courts. No 
Justice disagreed with these propositions. Shady Grove is important because 
the way the Court interprets ambiguous state statutes will affect 
outcomes—and as Justice Ginsburg explains, Scalia’s rather wooden 
textualism does not make much sense when trying to determine how a 
statute should operate in contexts the lawmakers did not contemplate.244 But 
once a method of interpretation is chosen, the analysis is straightforward. 
CONCLUSION 
I have tried elsewhere to demonstrate that thinking about choice-of-law 
problems from the perspective of the two-step model renders them much 
easier to resolve.245 Here I have argued the same thing about a variety of 
Erie problems. Because Erie is, I believe, fundamentally a choice-of-law 
case, that result should not be surprising. That the two-step model works so 
well here should buttress the case that Erie is best understood as a choice-
of-law case. It should also enhance the appeal of the model itself. That is 
my ultimate aim—to demonstrate that this way of thinking about the 
general problem is superior to the approach that takes choice of law to be 
some sort of metaprocedure divorced from substantive law. 
 
533–34 (1949) (“We cannot give [the cause of action] longer life in the federal court than it would have 
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